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Abstract
The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico awakened communities
to the increased risk of large-scale damage along their coastlines presented by new technology in
deep water drilling. Normal accident theory and high reliability theory offer a framework
through which to view the 2010 spill that features predictive criteria linked to a qualitative
assessment of risk presented by technology and organizations. The 2010 spill took place in a
sociotechnical system that can be described as complex and tightly coupled, and therefore prone
to normal accidents. However, the entities in charge of managing this technology lacked the
organizational capacity to safely operate within this sociotechnical system.

Normal accident, high reliability, 2010, BP oil spill, Gulf of Mexico, technological disaster,
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, environmental impact
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon blowout and oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico traumatized
the Gulf coast and awakened society to the looming threat of new technologies in oil drilling that
present risks many orders of magnitude larger than were present in the past. This thesis aims to
answer a question that nags at the societal dependence on fossil fuels, which is: Are oil spills
inevitable? Will the Gulf of Mexico, and later the Arctic tundra become the common victims of
poorly understood environmentally exploitive practices? Are these accidents avoidable
considering their highly technical and delicately balanced nature combined with the
organizational failure inherent in human endeavors? This thesis will search for answers derived
from accident theory and organizational literature to answer these questions, and will aim to
draw conclusions and set forth policy recommendations based on the risk presented by
dangerous new technologies.

Purpose of the Thesis
The goal of this thesis is to present a view of the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon accident
grounded in organizational theory that may offer insight to decision-makers and stakeholders in
the Gulf region as well as other areas affected by or at risk of contamination from newly
developed extractive technologies. The topic of the 2010 spill is significant because it exhibits
the uncontrollable power of a technological accident as well as the conflict between reliance on
unsustainable energy resources with the necessity to preserve ecological resources and
environmental quality.
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The analysis conducted in this thesis will address how the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon
blowout and oil spill can be characterized within disaster theory by attempting to answer the
following questions: 1) Was the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon Spill preventable within its
existing sociotechnical system? Sub-question a) Do normal accident theory and high reliability
theory apply to this event? Sub-question b) If these theories are applicable to this event, what
indicators and criteria are appropriate for analysis? Sub-question c) How is the spill
characterized in terms of these concepts and indicators?

The findings of this analysis will indicate whether the 2010 spill was inevitable based on
indicators drawn from normal accident theory and high reliability theory. These findings weigh
heavily in questions of whether or not to continue this risky technological endeavor, a topic
partially broached by the advent of the 2010 spill and subsequent temporary moratorium on deep
water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico. These questions also point to necessary changes to be
incorporated into this sociotechnical system post-BP spill, and lend criteria by which to judge
whether or not adequate steps have been taken to address these indicators of imminent disaster
within the system. Finally, this thesis attempts to examine the tension between inherently
accident-prone technology and organizational attempts to cope with this inherent risk in order to
use this technology.

Narrative of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon Blowout
The 2010 Deepwater Horizon blowout event can be seen, as many accidents are in
retrospect, as the result of errors and oversimplifications, an accretion of misread signals and an
accumulation of faulty estimates in an unforgiving environment. The following narrative is
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largely drawn from the 2011 “Report Regarding the Causes of the April 20, 2010 Macondo Well
Blowout” published by the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement,
which details each step of the disaster and identifies technical causes of the blowout, and is
supplemented by technical descriptions of events from other reports.

BP first established the Macondo well as an exploratory well in the Gulf of Mexico, a
process which provided limited information about its hydrocarbon reserve, yet promised
adequate reason to cement and “temporarily abandon” the well in order to facilitate future
extraction processes (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011: 13-21; Deepwater
Horizon Study Group, 2011). Temporary abandonment includes the cementing of the well and
the installation of plugs to control hydrocarbon flow and facilitate extraction (U.S. Department
of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011: 14-15). It is important to note that the Deepwater Horizon rig
was a dynamically positioned mobile offshore drilling unit (DP MODU). DP MODUs are “not
moored to the seafloor but instead hold their position over the well through a combination of
satellite technology and directional thruster activity (Ibid: 14).” This DP MODU apparatus was
attached to the well bore (the hole in the hydrocarbon formation) through a drill “string” armed
with a blow out preventer (BOP) stack which was located close to the well bore (Ibid 14-15).

The correct installation of a well depends on maintaining a balance between the pressure
exerted by the formation on drilling and piping equipment and the capacity of the formation to
withstand pressure (Ibid 27-28). Drilling mud is utilized to supply this balance, and is calibrated
specifically to apply pressure to the formation that keeps the liquids within the formation in a
controlled state. “In short, the mud must be heavy enough to control the pore pressure and ensure
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that the formation fluids (including hydrocarbons) do not enter the wellbore, while not so heavy
that it fractures the formation (Ibid 27-28).” This narrow window between the pressures needed
to maintain the integrity of the formation while controlling the substances within it is referred to
in the drilling industry as the “drilling margin (Ibid, 27-28).”

The Macondo well was notorious for its peculiarity and difficult conditions before the
accident occurred. The well presented problems in 2009, upon the first attempts to drill into it,
when operators experienced well “kicks” in October 2009 and March 2010 (Ibid, 75-77). A kick
is a serious well event referring to the “unwanted influx of formation fluids, such as
hydrocarbons, into the wellbore (Ibid, 98).” It is crucial that operators identify these events in a
timely fashion, as they can lead to a blow out situation, as eventually seen on April 20, 2010
(U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011:21, 98; Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2012). With
close monitoring and active response, however, operators have been known to control well kicks
and prevent escalation of the situation (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011: 21,
98-99; Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2012). A second problem commonly experienced with the
Macondo well was that of “lost returns” of drilling mud and fluid into the formation, which
indicates a delicate formation that may have fractured in areas, allowing it to absorb fluid
exerting great pressure on the formation at the time (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE,
2011: 19-20; Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011).

The goal of cementing the Macondo well was to achieve “zonal isolation” within the
formation (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011:40). The standard procedure to
cement and abandon a well includes cementing operations, pressure testing to make sure that the

4

constructed well can withstand the environmental pressures, the setting of a casing, and
placement of a cement plug into the well to secure it against pressure forces (Ibid, 2, 14-16, 2021, 87). At the completion of these temporary abandonment procedures, the attending rig
generally leaves the site to allow another rig to extract hydrocarbons from the well at a later date
(Ibid, 14).

Many dormant issues belied the temporary abandonment procedures of the Macondo
well, including a lack of information about the hydrocarbon formation, faulty well design, and a
failure to cope with the significant lost material into the well formation as a result of the tight
drilling margin (Ibid, 13-14, 20, 38, 41-47, 53-54). These dormant issues created a risky
environment in which small errors in operations within the well could be magnified into large
system accidents when combined with malfunctioning equipment and inadequate staff capacity.

On April 20, 2010 the crew of the Deepwater Horizon conducted positive and negative
pressure tests to verify that the cement job in the well was adequately sealed and could withstand
the pressure of the formation (Ibid, 21-22, 85). The positive pressure test was successful,
however the two subsequent negative tests performed by the crew were largely inconclusive, but
were interpreted incorrectly by the crew as being successful (Ibid 21-22, 88-97). Finally, on the
evening of April 20, the crew conducted displacement procedures, in which they pumped out the
drilling mud that had been used to maintain a pressure balance in the well, and replaced this mud
with seawater in order to place the final seal on the well. During these displacement procedures,
the hydrocarbon formation exerted immense pressure on the cement well structure with little
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balancing force exerted from inside the well (typically referred to as an underbalanced condition)
(Ibid, 86-88, 94-103).

The well eventually experienced a well “kick” during these displacement procedures,
which indicates the flow of hydrocarbons into the well and demands quick well control action,
however the crew did not recognize this kick and failed to respond adequately, allowing
hydrocarbons to flow up the well and onto the Deepwater Horizon deck (Ibid, 99-103). The crew
then responded by diverting this flow to a mud gas separator that failed and spewed combustible
gas within proximity to engines on the rig, which exploded and ignited the gas (Ibid, 103-106).
The crew then attempted to initiate emergency procedures to activate the blow out preventer
mechanism and disengage the Deepwater Horizon from the well, but these attempts failed due to
multiple mechanical errors, leaving the well spewing oil and eventually sinking the Deepwater
Horizon (Ibid 107-108, 129-144). Many of the crewmembers escaped the accident, however 11
members died and an estimated five million barrels of oil were released into the Gulf of Mexico.
The Macondo well was capped and later sealed on September 19, 2010 (Ibid, 1, 24).

The 2010 spill took a large toll on the health of the various ecosystems and local
economies of the Gulf of Mexico and the Gulf coast. It threatened the sensitive populations of
migratory shorebirds, fish, and mammals with widespread and intergenerational consequences
for these species (Henkel et. al., 2012; National Wildlife Federation, 2013). The deluge of oil
suffocated the marshlands of the Mississippi River delta system (Lin and Mendelssohn, 2012),
which serve a crucial function within the ecosystem and protect human settlements against the
brutal hurricanes that attack the coast regularly. The oil and dispersants that cleanup workers and
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seafood customers contacted in the time following the spill are suspected to have caused a wide
range of physical ailments (Goldstein et. al., 2011), and some authors have suggested that the
toxicity of these elements in seafood products was not adequately represented in federal studies
(Rotkin-Ellman et. al., 2012). The use of dispersants was criticized further because of the largely
untested method of applying them within the context of the 2010 spill (Iaquinto, 2012), as well
as their possible ramifications in the marine ecosystem (Zuijdgeest and Huettel, 2012; Berninger
et. al., 2011). Finally, the spill had far reaching mental health and financial ramifications borne
by the communities of the Gulf South, many of which are closely tied to the natural resources of
the area for their livelihoods (Lee and Blanchard, 2012; Johnston Jr. et. al., 2012).

Analysts of the 2010 spill not only recognize the environmental impacts of the spill on
the sensitive environment and fragile biodiversity of the Gulf of Mexico, but also note the deep
economic impacts of this accident. Many predict long-term negative impacts to the commercial
and recreational fishing and marine industries in the Gulf of Mexico and surrounding areas
(Sumaila et. al., 2012), in addition to the immediate negative impact experienced by the fishing
and tourism industries, and small businesses (Davis, 2011). The environmental, social, and
economic repercussions of the 2010 spill cannot be understated, as they have irreversibly
changed the Gulf coast.

The devastation resulting from the 2010 spill has left many residents searching for
answers and solutions to prevent spills in the future. While the deep water drilling industry has
grown, the increased risk to the environment and coastal livelihoods has grown with it, resulting
in a conflict between profitable extraction and safety that is currently playing out in post-spill
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battles about legislation. This thesis aims to confront the question of whether or not the spill was
preventable, and to shed light on how the sociotechnical system that controlled the operation of
the Deepwater Horizon failed to prevent this catastrophe.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
A review of the literature on accidents within sociotechnical systems includes an
assortment of theories that consider the temporal, probabilistic, structural, and organizational
aspects of industries and processes that present technological risk to society. Many authors
attempt to align characteristics of a system or organization with accident potential, while some
theorists consider the human/technology interface in society and base their claims on
communication as opposed to control. Most theorists in the field aim to improve the operations
or policy surrounding industries that present a threat to humans, while others seek to illuminate
the power structures that influence decisions concerning potentially catastrophic technologies.

Early Sociotechnical Disaster Theory
A thorough study of the literature on the organizational roots of technological disasters
begins with Barry Turner’s 1978 publication, Man-Made Disasters. In his survey of
technological disasters, Turner analyzed the preconditions of disasters from a sociotechnical
standpoint, including aspects such as imperfect knowledge distribution, centralization of
decision-making, complex failures of compatibility, and gaps in responsibility (Turner 1978:3-6,
23-24, 58, 66).

Turner’s research, like others in the sociotechnical disaster literature, links human control
over processes that use or distribute energy with disaster risk and highlights the importance of
communication in dangerous sociotechnical systems (Turner 1978:3,38, 121-124). One of
Turner’s most valuable contributions to sociotechnical disaster theory is his introduction of the
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“intubation period,” a concept that describes the accumulation of minor errors and weaknesses
that accumulate preceding, and eventually causing, a technological disaster (Turner 1978:86-90).

Turner’s model is the basis of a later created time-based concept known as Disaster
Incubation Theory (DIT), introduced by Turner and Pidgeon in 1997. DIT asserts that
organizations can slip into complacency and suffer increased entropy and chaos as they
accumulate dangerous precedents and practices that eventually combine to create an accident
(Turner and Pidgeon, 1997 as cited in Shrivastava et. al., 2009). Shrivastava, Sonpar, and
Pazzaglia, in 2009, refer to this trend toward increased accident risk through the accumulation of
errors as “the gradual erosion of reliability,” and thus link this train of thought with theoretical
influences that strive to prevent accidents before they happen (Shrivastava et. al., 2009).

In contrast to Turner and Pidgeon’s work on the accumulation of error in a temporal
perspective (1997), some accident theorists have based their studies on James Reason’s Swiss
cheese model (SCM) of accident prevention, which considers the cumulative nature of errors and
the relative probability of these errors occurring in tandem to facilitate a disaster (Reason, 1998
as cited in Shrivastava et. al., 2009). This theory can be visualized as layers of safety barriers
(like pieces of stacked Swiss cheese) that combine to form a solid barrier with the exception of
the situation in which the holes in the Swiss cheese align, thereby allowing an incident to occur
(Reason, 1998 as cited in Shrivastava et. al., 2009).
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Introduction to Normal Accident Theory
Charles Perrow’s Normal Accident theory not only focused on the human/technology
interface, as previous theorists had, it identified aspects of technical and social systems that make
disaster not only possible, but unavoidable, or “normal” (Shrivastava et. al., 2009; Perrow, 1999:
5, 63, 333-334; Sagan, 1993: 28-29). In his normal accident theory, Perrow considers the
structural and organizational contributing causes of technological disasters, and identifies two
attributes -- complexity and coupling -- that serve as measures of a system’s potential to create a
disaster (Perrow 1999: 72-97). As dictated by the theory, the accidents that result from the
confluence of these two attributes are considered “normal” or “system” accidents because they
are inevitable given the level of complexity and tight coupling inherent in the subject system
(Perrow, 1999: 5). Normal accident theory, as first described by Perrow, is based on the ‘garbage
can’ model developed by Cohen, March, and Olsen (1988) and March and Olsen (1979). This
model asserts that an organization may be characterized by many conflicting goals and
uncertainty, and may therefore not always act as a rational actor, and may exercise bounded
rationality1 in decision-making (Perrow, 1994; Perrow, 1999: 323-324; Sagan, 1993, 29-31).

In his quest to identify why some industries or processes rife with safety procedures and
defenses against failure still manage to experience major accidents, Perrow notes that the
qualities of complexity and tight coupling within a system demand different specific authority
structures in order for a given organization to cope with these technical challenges (Perrow,
1999: 330-335). A high level of interconnectedness between system components, reliance on
indirect information sources, an unpredictable environment, or incomprehensibility of a system
1

The term “bounded rationality” refers to “limits on [humans’] thinking capacities and our inability to often
achieve or even seek absolute rationality (Perrow, 1999: 323).” Rationality, in this instance, refers to perfect
reasoning and consideration of all alternatives (Selten, 1999).
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to its operators indicates complexity within a system (Perrow, 1999: 85-86). This quality may
require specialized operator jobs and a decentralized command structure in emergent situations
and accident prevention. This allows operators closest to the failing units or subsystems to
exercise their knowledge to prevent escalation to a large-scale accident (Perrow, 1999: 332).

Tight coupling is often indicated by a tendency within the technical system for small
failures to be magnified and instigate major failures elsewhere in the system with little time for
intervention. Tight coupling, therefore, requires a centralized authority structure to effectively
anticipate the effects of specific actions on the system as a whole. A central authority figure
familiar with all of the parts of a system may be better equipped to handle tightly coupled
interactions (Perrow, 1999: 333-335). An example of a centralized structure is a military
hierarchy or the influence of strict accident training and procedures implemented in an industrial
setting (Perrow, 1999: 333-335).

Normal accident theory asserts that a high level of complexity and tight coupling within a
sociotechnical system predicts an accident within that system because the organizations that
control these processes are unable to provide a simultaneously centralized and decentralized
authority structure (Perrow 1999: 5, 334-335). This dilemma is an extension of contingency
theories first developed by Burns and Stalker (1961) and Woodward (1965).2 It leads Perrow to
conclude that systems with these qualities are naturally prone to disaster regardless of their
technical safety buffers or procedures (Perrow 1999: 4-5, 334).

2

Perrow draws from contingency theorists’ assertion that “centralization is appropriate for organizations
with routine tasks, and decentralization for those with nonroutine tasks (Perrow, 1999: 334).”
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Complexity
The first attribute that Perrow identifies as a contributor to normal accidents within
sociotechnical systems is that of complexity. Complexity describes such factors as the level of
interdependency or interconnectedness among physical, chemical, or biological components of
the system, the relative obscurity of the results of operators’ commands, or the sheer
incomprehensibility of the subject technical system to an operator who may be trained to focus
only on a single component (Perrow 1999: 78, 88).

To illustrate the concept of complexity within a sociotechnical system, Perrow utilizes
the concept of an assembly line as an example of a linear, and thus not complex, system (Perrow
1999: 72). Some indicators of complexity include multifunctional components within a system,
proximity (enabling unforeseen interactions between separate components), reliance on indirect
information sources, multiple “control parameters,” specialization of personnel, and an uncertain
environment3 (Perrow 1999: 72-75, 84-86; Shrivastava et. al., 2009).

One example of a complex interaction based on proximity of two elements would be in
Perrow’s example of an oil tanker accident in which the oil storage location was near the engine
room. Designers had not planned for these two areas to affect one another, however when an
object pierced the hull of the ship, damaging the structural integrity of the oil storage and the
engine room, the oil seeped into the engine room and ignited (Perrow 1999: 73-74). In this chain
of events, two areas that were not planned to interact with each other did interact, causing an

3

A complete list of the indicators and a working definition of complexity is included in Appendix A, page 86.
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unforeseen event – the fire. This is an example of complexity, illustrating that complexity within
a system is directly linked with uncertainty and unpredicted interactions.

Coupling
The second attribute that Perrow identifies is “tight coupling,” which generally refers to
the degree to which the action of one physical, chemical, or biological component within the
system affects the action of another component (Perrow 1999: 89-93). Tight coupling, as
defined by Perrow, refers to a process similar to a chemical reaction in that it must be buffered
by safety designs such as redundancies, safety alarms, etc., due to a lack of human capacity to
interfere in tightly-coupled processes at certain points (Perrow 1999: 90-94). However this
concept can also describe processes that do not lend themselves to improvisation, such as
processes that can only be completed in a specific order or where the substitution of parts or
personnel is not possible (Shrivastava et. al., 2009; Perrow 1999: 90-94).

This definition applies to strict, highly monitored or regulated processes with little slack
for improvisation within the context of an accident. Therefore, tightly coupled systems are
somewhat less able to absorb shocks or changes within their normal operating environment and
rather only perform correctly within specific limits of conditions and are often indicated by the
presence of automatic safety buffers and redundancies4 (Perrow 1999: 93-95).

A simple example of tight coupling can be seen in a chemical reaction, in which the
addition of one chemical triggers a fast process change (for example the addition of baking soda

4

A list of the indicators and a working definition of coupling is included in Appendix A, page 86.
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to vinegar triggers a bubbling effect). In contrast, the addition of baking soda to a mixture of
flour, sugar, and eggs will not trigger a quick shift of the mixture into a batch of cookies, and
instead this process requires the baker to execute many steps in a sequence. Coupling is therefore
a time-based concept meaning that the speed of a reaction is directly indicative of coupling.
Coupling is also a concept linked with direct causality, meaning that if one action invariably
triggers a specific action, these two events are tightly coupled.

Other Factors Affecting Risk
In his survey of normal accidents, Perrow notes several factors (beyond complexity and
coupling) within various industries that contribute to disaster risk, including production
pressures, automated technology, conflicting agency goals, various legal incentives and liability,
regulatory relationships, and the possible effects of a disaster, (Perrow 1999: 108-118, 131-132,
158-159, 166, 172-173, 176). Perrow also comments on a trend within dangerous sociotechnical
systems whereby increased safety precautions or technology allow managers to push the limits of
safeguards and operate within thin safety margins, ensuring increased efficiency rather than safer
operation (Perrow 1999: 146, 180).

Perrow, in his review of Sagan’s 1993 publication, highlights a number of organizational
characteristics not previously specifically discussed within normal accident theory that affect the
level of risk within a system including (Perrow, 1994):

•

experience/duration spent to achieve an operating scale

•

experience with “critical phases”
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•

the availability and open sharing of information on errors

•

close proximity of elites to the system operations

•

organizational control over members

•

“organizational density of the system’s environment”

It should be noted, however, that Perrow does not make an effort to include these factors into his
argument for the inevitability of disasters, and simply mentions them in passing.

In 1993, Scott Sagan applied normal accident theory to nuclear weapons accidents within
the United States. In this analysis, Sagan adheres closely to the original definitions of complexity
and coupling put forward by Perrow in 1984. Sagan, however, delves deeper into the influence of
production pressures and regulatory relationships, and places an emphasis on power and
relationships that dictate the management of technology with a high catastrophic potential (Sagan
1993: 37-39, 41-43, 207-210, 252-259).

Cost and Production Pressures within Normal Accident Theory
Perrow (1999) and Sagan (1993) both recognize that cost and production pressures have a
direct and substantial influence on safety capacity within organizations. In his examination of
cost and production pressures on sociotechnical systems with the capacity to create disasters,
Perrow recognizes that many firms may externalize the risk or effects of their processes, thus
resulting in a market failure. However Perrow insists that the capitalist system which allows this
market externality is not at fault in this instance, as proven by the fact that sociotechnical
production systems in non-capitalist systems are under the same production pressures as those
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within capitalist systems because they must compete globally5 (Perrow 1999: 339-342). This line
of thought would lead one to believe that cost and production pressures may play a part in
creating risk within sociotechnical systems, but that these issues are not the main culprit in
normal accidents.

In his analysis of explosions at chemical processing plants, Perrow concludes that cost
and production pressures are a constant within industrial endeavors and that human organizations
will predictably exercise some degree of human error and inability to detect important anomalies
within their processes (Perrow, 1999: 111-112). By this description, Perrow appears to ignore the
spectrum of influence that cost and production pressures or incompetence can have within
different firms. Although he recognizes that these issues affect risk, Perrow does not provide
measurable indicators of the degree of influence that cost and production pressures have on a
system’s proclivity to a normal accident.

In my opinion, Perrow’s view of constant cost pressures and human ineptitude is an
oversimplification within normal accident theory, as it seems that higher relative levels of cost
and production pressures play a part in dramatically increasing complexity and coupling beyond
the level inherent within the technical system. These trends also appear to have the effect of
lowering levels of safety and preparedness for accidents. Examples of this phenomenon may
include utilizing faster or more efficient processes that increase common-mode components (an
indicator of complexity) and shorten time for human intervention into processes (tightening
coupling). One example of the connection between cost pressures and coupling can be observed
5

It should be noted that this description of the relationship between capitalist systems and production
pressures was written in 1984 and republished in 1999, and therefore may not adequately describe the
current global marketplace brought on by increased globalization in the 21st century.
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in Perrow’s description of the reduction of staff numbers in flight crews (prompted by financial
savings), which “will lead to much tighter coupling – that is, less resources for recovery from
incidents (Perrow, 1999: 161).”

Sagan focuses on cost and production pressures through the lens of evaluating the
applicability of normal accident theory to nuclear weapons accidents in the U.S. In his analysis,
Sagan notes that the organizational results of production pressures, for example hasty decisionmaking and procedures conducted in a rushed and imperfect fashion, often accompany a normal
accident, thereby linking these concepts, rather than commenting on them as separate phenomena
within a system (Sagan, 1993: 36-38). Although Perrow and Sagan provide observations on the
relationship between cost and production pressures, this factor is not adequately represented in
the main concepts and indicators of normal accident theory.

Normal accident theorists discuss cost and production pressures as contributing to
accident risk, but do not list measurable indicators of the degree to which these qualities
contribute to systemic failure. Based on this treatment of the variable of cost and production
pressures within normal accident theory, I hypothesize that normal accident theory is not capable
of adequately describing all system accidents and fails to address the critical influence of cost
and production pressures on accident risk.

Interests and Power in Normal Accident Theory
Perrow and Sagan have elaborated on group interests and power (Sagan, 1993 as cited in
Perrow, 1994), structural incentives for neglecting safety (Perrow, 1994), and organizational
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learning impeded by ineffective communication (Sagan, 1993: 252-259) within the context of
normal accident theory.

One major way in which normal accident theory addresses power issues in accidents is
the transfer of blame in accidents from ‘operator error’ to system dysfunctions and interactions
(Perrow 1999: 63). This implies that many accidents may be the result of a system that includes
budget cuts to critical safety processes, poorly designed equipment, and a push toward increased
production, yet the accident that results from this system may be blamed on operator error.

In his research into “accident inducing systems,” such as the marine transportation
industry, Perrow (1999) cites failures in management that are directly related to power structures
encouraging unsafe operation. Perrow contends that limited financial loss in the event of an
accident, inelastic demand, low-status or anonymous victims, delayed accident effect, and the
absence of elites as victims in the risky system are factors that promote unsafe operation from a
management perspective (Perrow 1999: 67-70, 171-173). Perrow further argues that managers of
dangerous technologies are prone to perverse incentives built into the management structures of
firms that punish expenses and delays associated with safety precautions, and that allow
managers to make decisions that ignore an accident’s latency period (Perrow, 1994).

Sagan, in his 1994 response to Perrow’s article, agrees and adds that institutional
mindsets may prevent improvements in safety even after an accident due to reflexive adoption of
redundancy, and failure to actually learn lessons from mishaps due to agency secrecy and
competition as well as a false confidence in the ability to avoid disasters (Sagan, 1994).
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Criticisms of Normal Accident Theory
Normal accident theory is imperfect, and has been thoroughly critiqued within the
organizational accident literature. The most significant critique of normal accident theory leveled
by Hopkins (1999) is that the theory, as originally developed by Perrow, applies to a very narrow
category of accidents and that it is difficult to adequately determine which accidents are
described by normal accident theory. An example of this issue can be seen in Perrow’s 1994
article in which the author does not classify the gas leak in Bhopal, India in 1984, the Challenger
space shuttle disaster, the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident, or the spill of the Exxon Valdez
oil tanker as normal accidents6. Many critics conversely argue that some of these major accidents
have taken place in seemingly complex and tightly coupled systems (Hopkins, 1999; Shrivastava
et. al., 2009).

Hopkins (1999) further criticizes Perrow, in his original construction of normal accident
theory, for a lack of criteria by which to place specific industries or processes within his matrix
of complexity and coupling. Perrow, in response to this common critique of his theory, agreed
that a unit of measurement of the small errors within sociotechnical systems with the capacity to
disrupt the system by bypassing safety measures is necessary (Perrow, 1994).

Shrivastava et. al. (2009) note an additional critique in that normal accident theory
utilizes the concepts of complexity and coupling as if they are static characteristics of a system.
Shrivastava et. al. (2009) contend that complexity is a relative concept subject to the cognitive

6

Although many of these events can be classified as “disasters” rather than “accidents” due to their
devastating scale or nature, Perrow does not distinguish between disasters and accidents throughout his
1999 publication, and uses the term “accident” to describe large-scale system failures – thus designating
more weight to this word that its standard connotation would imply.
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capacity of operators within a system and that coupling is subject to the degree of conceptual
slack allotted to operators within a system (Schulman 1993 as referenced in Shrivastava et. al.,
2009). Based on these considerations, Shrivastava et. al. argue that Perrow overlooks a human
component in complexity and coupling. Their critique focuses on the flawed, rigid view of a
system provided by normal accident theory (centering on the paradox of centralized v.
decentralized control). These authors insist that sociotechnical systems include variable human
elements that allow for flexibility in coping with complexity and coupling (Shrivastava et. al.,
2009).

Another critique of normal accident theory is that proponents of the theory have generally
compiled and tested their theory through the analysis of archival data found in accident reports
(Roberts, 1990; Bain, 1999). This method clearly has its faults, including a lack of pertinent
details and explanations, as well as the possibility of firms intentionally withholding information.
In response to this criticism, however, Perrow warns against accident researchers ‘going native’
in the search for empirical evidence, and thus neglecting to anticipate failures within their
respective organizations (Perrow, 1994).

Normal accident theory has significant issues in its application to accidents and
sociotechnical systems. As alluded to on pages 15-19, this theory attempts to describe inherent
risk in sociotechnical systems using the variables of complexity and coupling, however this
classification system ignores many major concepts such as cost and production pressures and
power structures. Although both Perrow and Sagan acknowledge these factors as important,
normal accident theory fails to provide measurable indicators for these concepts, and relegates
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these ideas to the status of side issues. High reliability theory, detailed below, may serve to
supplement these deficiencies within normal accident theory, by providing an organizational
perspective that places emphasis on organizational learning, the prioritization of safety, and the
formation of a ‘culture’ of reliability within a firm or industry. These two theories, in
combination, may also apply to a broader range of accidents, as they provide social and technical
indicators of risk7.

An application of normal accident and high reliability theories to an accident event is, by
its nature reliant on accident reports. This method therefore does not account for the dynamic
characteristic of risk over time (as alluded to in Shrivastava et. al., 2009), and only offers a
snapshot of the sociotechnical system in which the subject accident took place.

Although normal accident theory and high reliability theory, as drafted by their seminal
authors, do not include specific criteria to link accident causation with the indicators of main
theoretical concepts such as complexity, safety prioritization, etc., this thesis attempts to
establish criteria for these concepts based on an examination of their narrative application within
the literature.

Answer to Normal Accident Theory: High Reliability Theory
High reliability theory refers to the study of organizations in charge of high-risk
technology that experience very few accidents. This realm of accident theory developed in the
late 1980s and early 1990s in direct response to Perrow’s normal accident theory (Sagan, 1993:
7

Many high reliability theorists, in fact, insist that their method applies to a broader range of accidents than
does Perrow in his 1994 article – see Hopkins 1999, Shrivastava et. al., 2009, La Porte 1994, Roberts 1990b,
Roberts and Bea, 2001.
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14-16; Shrivastava et. al., 2009; La Porte and Consolini, 1991; La Porte, 1994). High reliability
theorists generally responded to Perrow’s theory by asking: If complexity and coupling lead to
inevitable accidents, why have some firms in charge of seemingly complex and tightly coupled
processes avoided system accidents? These theorists specifically considered the frequency of
‘near misses’ or avoided accidents and the extensive safety record of some organizations. From
these they identified common management themes that successful firms employed to greatly
reduce or eliminate accident potential (La Porte and Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1990b).

Scholars at the University of California at Berkeley including Todd LaPorte, Paula
Consolini, Gene Rochlin, Karlene Roberts, and Robert Bea, and at the University of Michigan at
Ann Arbor including Karl Weick and Kathleen Sutcliffe, pioneered research into high reliability
organizations. These scholars asserted that organizations can avoid system disasters by practicing
organizational learning and “sophisticated methods of trial and error,” while prioritizing safety
above all other objectives and socializing operators to work within a decentralized authority
structure while harboring a common operating culture (La Porte, 1994; La Porte and Consolini,
1991; Sagan, 1993: 16-24; Roberts and Bea, 2001; Weick, 1987).

More specifically, high reliability theorists look at the ways in which organizations in
control of high hazard technologies seek out weak links in their processes and methodically
adjust their processes to accommodate a changing environment (Roberts and Bea, 2001; Sagan,
1993:25). Roberts, in her account of a nuclear aircraft carrier’s processes, emphasizes constant
training as well as an authority structure that designates responsibility to the lowest ranking
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members of the organization and allows for negotiation with leadership, thereby introducing
flexibility and decentralization into a traditionally hierarchical structure (Roberts, 1990b).

The tenets of high reliability theory are somewhat more diffuse than those presented by
Perrow and Sagan in normal accident theory, due to their diverse authorship. From these
numerous contributors, however, organizational learning, prioritization of safety, and
organizational “culture” stand out as three common threads that high reliability theorists discuss
as aiding in the vigilance and resilience of an organization.

Organizational Learning
Much of the literature on high reliability organizations focuses on these firms ability to
learn over time and incrementally adjust their processes to reduce failure. In his description of
high reliability theory, Sagan suggests that although trial and error serves as an opportunity for
organizational learning to take place (as suggested by Wildavsky), high reliability firms must
often rely on “simulations and imagination of trials and errors” to improve their processes
because the social cost of their failure is so high (Sagan, 1993: 25-26; Wildavsky, 1988: 17 as
referenced in Sagan, 1993). Roberts and Bea add to this concept by noting that some high
reliability organizations practice almost constant training or accident imagination, and are able to
identify parts of the system that require redundancies as a result of organizational learning
(Roberts, 1990a, Roberts and Bea, 2001).
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Prioritization of Safety
The prioritization of safety is a critical concept in high reliability theory. Many high
reliability theorists argue that a reduction in accidents within a given sociotechnical system is
only possible if both elites and managers recognize that the social cost of an accident is
unacceptable, and therefore prioritize safety as the primary objective of the organization (La
Porte and Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1990a; Sagan, 1993: 17-19). This assertion that safety must
be prioritized, however, speaks to two social concepts: first, that elites (regulators and those with
power) must have a stake in the avoidance of accidents within these systems and second, that
managers within the entirety of a firm must prioritize safety over profit or efficiency (Sagan,
1993: 17-19).

Organizational Culture
A third concept embraced by high reliability theorists is that of an organizational culture
that serves to socialize operators thoroughly so that they use common operating procedures and
decision-making reasoning (Roberts, 1990b). This culture, if implemented correctly, allows for
decentralization within the authority structure of a firm – addressing emergency situations or
peak load periods – while maintaining a consistent set of assumptions and goals within the group
of operators serving a firm (Roberts, 1990b; Sagan, 1993: 21-25; Roberts and Bea, 2001). High
reliability theorists list qualities such as open communication, clear designations of
responsibility, and adequate training of employees as key factors in the cultivation of a safetyoriented organizational culture within a firm (Roberts and Bea, 2001; Sagan, 1993: 21-25;
Roberts, 1990b).
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High Reliability Theory vs. Normal Accident Theory
Some organizational theorists have attempted to contrast high reliability theory with
normal accident theory, thus framing the two theories as competing perspectives (Perrow, 1994,
Sagan, 1993). This inclination is likely based on the fact that normal accident theory and high
reliability theory do not neatly rest on the same theoretical assumptions concerning rationality,
organizational structure, or the importance of redundancy (La Porte 1994, Sagan, 1993:16-28).

One example of these theoretical differences is that high reliability theory, unlike that of
normal accident theory, insists that redundancy (in terms of mechanical functions or people) can
improve safety by “[making] a reliable system out of unreliable parts” (La Porte, 1994; Roberts,
1990b). Because this has been a point of the dispute between the theories and due to its lack of
conceptual prominence in recent publications8, this concept will not be considered as a main
tenet of high reliability theory within this thesis, however it is significant that this concept
appears in the high reliability theory literature.

More significantly, high reliability theory is often either tacitly or explicitly based on a
rational model of organizations, and therefore claims that organizations can prioritize safety
above all other objectives, an assertion that conflicts with Perrow’s adoption of the garbage can
model in normal accident theory (La Porte, 1994; Perrow, 1994; Robers, 1990b). Finally, some
high reliability theorists claim that “nearly error-free” organizations are able to experience the
benefits of a centralized and decentralized authority structure simultaneously through intense
socialization and communication, a notion that goes against Perrow’s assertion that these modes

8

Examples of this include Roberts and Bea, 2001 and Shrivastava et. al., 2009.
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are mutually exclusive (Roberts, 1990b; Roberts and Bea, 2001; La Porte 1994; Shrivastava et.
al., 2009).

Although high reliability theory clearly expresses differences with the premises of normal
accident theory, many theorists hold that these two theories are not competing perspectives, and
rather function as “blindfolded observers feeling different parts of an elephant (Rosa, 2005)”
(Shrivastava et. al., 2009; La Porte, 1994). Additionally, both normal accident theory and high
reliability theory have been described as incomplete or featuring an “under-developed systems
perspective that warrants a synthesis of the two concepts in analysis of accidents (Shrivastava et.
al. 2009).” The symbiosis between the two theories may be observed within the framework of a
structural view of a sociotechnical system as exemplified by normal accident theory
accompanied by a view of power and safety culture based more in management, as exemplified
by high reliability theory (Rosa, 2005).

Because high reliability theory evolved as a response to the organizational challenges set
forth by normal accident theory, namely complexity and coupling, high reliability theory is often
framed as an attempt to answer these challenges (Roberts, 1990b; Shrivastava et. al., 2009). This
relationship sets up a dialogue between the measures of normal accident theory concepts, which
set forth the degree to which the sociotechnical system is burdened by complexity and coupling,
and the measures of high reliability theory concepts, which measure the ability of an
organization to cope with complexity and coupling.
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Criticisms of High Reliability Theory
Due to its predominant focus on organizational and social factors, one clear criticism of
high reliability theory, made by Perrow, is that it ignores technical or environmental factors
within a sociotechnical system and only looks to management in disaster causation (Perrow,
1994). This is an apt critique that is clearly addressed by the combination of a technical system
analysis based on normal accident theory accompanied by an application of the tenets of high
reliability (Roberts, 1990b; Shrivastava et. al., 2009; La Porte and Consolini, 1991). An
additional critique of this theory is that its link to causality cannot be entirely proven due to a
lack of “systematic comparisons with non-HROs” (Shrivastava et. al., 2009). This critique
appears to be a temporary issue, as further development of high reliability theory could seek to
address this lack of evidence.

A third, and more damning critique of high reliability theory, which also applies to
normal accident theory, is that of the accusation of non-falsifiability as noted by Rosa (2005) and
reiterated by Shrivastava et. al. in 2009. Shrivastava et. al. comment on this flaw by asserting
that normal accidents theory and high reliability theory can neither be proven nor disproven in
practice based on the lack of measurable concept criteria presented in each theory (Shrivastava
et. al., 2009). This criticism of both theories may be addressed through further development of
indicators and criteria identifying main concepts within the theories, as well as the growth of
empirical studies applying these concepts to industrial practices (Shrivastava et. al., 2009; Rosa,
2005).
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Constructivist Approaches to Sociotechnical Systems
Normal accident theory and high reliability theory (as well as their predecessors such as
disaster intubation theory) are all based on organizational theories that specialize in a rational
approach to technical problems, thereby marking a separation between human and non-human
actors in a sociotechnical system. Other theoretical perspectives related to disasters in
sociotechnical systems provide an alternative interpretation of this relationship, including
science, technology, and society (STS) studies, actor-network theory, and the social construction
of technology. STS basically refers to a branch of scholarship that focuses on the relationship
between societal values and scientific research. STS focuses on the social context of scientific
discoveries and contributions, and questions the strictly empirical aura surrounding scientific
claims. Instead, it presents the notion that scientific knowledge may be socially constructed or at
the very least may be affected by the social context in which it takes place (Radder, 1992).

Actor-network theory (ANT), largely developed by Michel Callon, Bruno Latour, and
John Law, focuses on the relationship between human and non-human actors within a system.
Described as material-semiotics, ANT is innovative in its consideration of technology within a
network as an “actant,” placing emphasis on the network of ideas, tools, machines, and humans
or operators (Radder, 1992). Actor-network theory presents an interesting contrast to theories
emphasize the technical structure or organizational control of accidents, as actor-network theory
focuses attention to the relationships and connections between actors, as opposed to the control
of technology through science or society (Radder, 1992).
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Radder, in his publication on constructivist theories regarding science, contrasts the
normative suggestions in Perrow’s normal accidents theory with Latour’s actor-network theory
noting that while constructivist theories on science and technology may not specifically offer
direct policy guidance for the prevention of accidents, these theories do not lack a normative
angle, because all approaches to science, including those labeled ‘disinterested’ have normative
ideas underlying their practice (Radder, 1992). The author further notes that a broad normative
strategy that can be gleaned from an actor-network theory approach to technological accidents is
to implement projects with minimal catastrophic potential that are democratically supported by
all of the citizens involved in the process (including those affected by potential accidents)
(Radder, 1992). This perspective on adequate technologies seems to blend easily with Perrow’s
undertone of criticism for an unequal balance of power and risk with regard to technological
accidents (Perrow, 1999: 304-305, 309, 320-323, 341-342).

Differing Concepts of Reality
Various theoretical approaches to disaster causality hinge on conceptions of reality and
the possible multiple perspectives of reality in a given situation. Gephart (1984) proposes an
additional “political sensemaking model” which embraces the notion that there is no one
objective version of reality.

Gephart has many disagreements with Turner’s theory including: 1) Gephart asserts
(contrary to Turner’s rational model) that there is not one singular reality that operators in an
emergency situation are having trouble grasping, but instead there are multiple constructions of
reality based in language that are expressed by opposing sides; and 2) Gephart disagrees with
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Turner’s assertion that the preconditions for disaster happen right before the accident and are not
seen because of faulty paradigms of thought (Gephart, 1984). In this disagreement, Gephart
asserts that the preconditions for a disaster can last for a long time, using the infamous “Love
Canal” debacle as an example (Gephart, 1984).

It should be noted that many authors have grappled with the disconnect between
operators’ conceptions of reality and objective reality (later outlined in accident reports) in the
context of a technological system accident (Turner, 1978: 50-58, 128-129, 138-146, 154-156;
Perrow, 1999: 274-278; Weick, 1988). Gephart adds to this realm of theory by offering the
concept that no one version of reality is correct and that the reality of a situation changes with its
observer.
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Chapter 3: Research Methods
The research questions that I seek to address in this thesis are:
1. Was the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill preventable?
a. Do normal accident theory and high reliability theory apply to this event?
b. If these theories are applicable to this event, what indicators and criteria are
appropriate by which to determine if the event was preventable?
c. How is the spill characterized in terms of these five main indicators?

Normal Accident Theory and High Reliability Theory in Application
In order to answer my primary research question, “Was the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon
oil spill preventable?” I will use normal accident theory and high reliability theory, in tandem, to
identify the sociotechnical and organizational causes of the accident. By applying these theories
together, I will attempt to find whether complexity and coupling indicated a predication toward a
system accident (as set forth by normal accident theory), and whether the social system including
the Deepwater Horizon rig crew, management, and regulators functioned as a high reliability
organization with the capability to prevent such system accidents from occurring through
effective system management.

This thesis will utilize the concepts of normal accident theory and high reliability theory
developed by Perrow (1994, 1999), Sagan (1993, 1994), La Porte (1994 and 1991 with
Consolini), Roberts (1990 and 2001 with Bea), Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) and Shrivastava et. al.
(2009). I will apply criteria developed by the aforementioned authors to the causes, contributing
causes, and possible contributing causes of the BP spill identified in the 2011 Bureau of Ocean
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Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) “Report Regarding the Causes of
the April 20, 2010 Macondo Well Blowout” and the 2011 National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Chief Counsel’s Report entitled “Macondo:
the Gulf Oil Disaster.”

Methodology
The boundaries of the sociotechnical system that this thesis will analyze include the
Deepwater Horizon rig and the Macondo well (including all of the machinery, parts, and
materials therein), the operators and managers atop the rig, the managers and corporate
leadership of BP and its operating partners, and the regulatory regime of the Minerals
Management Service in April 2010 as it applied to the Macondo well project. My unit of analysis
will be the mechanical components (for example: the BOP stack, the drilling pipe, or the float
collar) and, in the instance of social factors, the decisions, or specific lack of action (for example:
the decision to use lost circulation material as a spacer, the failure to notify engine personnel of
gas alarms) that occurred within the sociotechnical system. Larger-scale factors, such as the
global economy, are generally outside of this boundary.

I have chosen to apply the normal accident theory concepts of complexity and coupling
and the high reliability theory concepts of organizational learning, prioritization of safety, and
organizational culture to the subject case study through the use of a series of indicators as listed
in Figures 1 and 2 (pp. 37-38). I will analyze each causal factor according to its alignment with
the indicators of normal accident theory, high reliability theory, or “other” (to indicate that the
causal factor does not fall into a category deemed significant within one of the two theories and
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may be explained by a different theoretical approach). I will then construct a matrix to visually
represent these findings. It should be noted that this analysis is qualitative and based on a single
rater, and therefore may be influenced by analyst bias or a bias expressed within the accident
reports (sources of data). Because of these conditions, some level of error will be built into this
analysis.

Upon classifying all of the causal factors of the spill, I will calculate the cumulative
number of factors that signify each theoretical concept, as well as their percentage of the total.
Although some causal factors may be linked to multiple theoretical concepts, the resulting
percentages will roughly indicate the weight of each concept in the causation of the spill. I have
set criteria to demarcate relative degrees of each concept’s influence in the causation of the spill,
which are listed and explained in Figures 1 and 2 (pp. 37-38). I aim to determine if the subject
sociotechnical system failed to prevent the Macondo well blowout due to complexity, tight
coupling, a lack of organizational learning, lack of prioritization of safety, or an inadequate
organizational culture9. This cumulative analysis of causal factors will assist in determining to
what degree factors such as technical complexity or coupling, centralization of command
structure, production pressures, knowledge gaps, and political/corporate power structures
affected the accident.

I have decided to apply normal accident theory and high reliability theory simultaneously
to this event because they are the dominant theoretical influences in the field of organizational

9

I describe tenets of high reliability organizations in a negative manner, because the goal of the thesis is to
answer whether or not a lack of these qualities led to the accident.
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analysis of sociotechnical disasters10 as noted by several theorists who have recently urged a
combination of the two methods (Shrivastava et. al., 2009; Rosa, 2005). Additionally, the
combination of the two theories allows for a broader application to a range of disasters, as well
as a more thorough examination of organizational causes of disaster, as each theory supplements
the weak points of the other. An example of this supplementary usage can be seen in the fact that
normal accident theory does not adequately set forth indicators to measure the effect that cost
and production pressures have on risk levels within a system, however high reliability theory
features indicators for the prioritization of safety that directly speak to this issue. Similarly, while
high reliability theory does not adequately address the possible failure of mechanical components
except through the concept of training and adaptation, normal accident theory provides indicators
to assess the level of inherent technological risk through complexity and coupling.

This complimentary relationship is apparent in my analysis, as many technological
failures can be attributed to complexity and coupling, while many managerial failures can be
attributed to a lack of organizational learning, lack of prioritization of safety, or inadequate
organizational culture. My application of normal accident theory concepts to technical aspects of
the Deepwater Horizon system is in keeping with the method by which Perrow employed the
theory to multiple case studies in his 1999 publication on a component and decision level
(Perrow, 1999: 15-32, 123-179). Similarly, my application of the concepts of high reliability
theory to motivations or strategies aimed at addressing complexity and tight coupling is
consistent with Karlene Robert’s analysis of high reliability as applied to nuclear aircraft carriers

10

The dominance of these theories within organizational accident literature is similarly exemplified by the
number of citations per work as follows: Perrow, 1984/1999 – 2,043; Sagan, 1993 – 274; La Porte and
Consolini, 1991 – 161; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001 – 549; Roberts, 1990b – 144; Weick, 1987 – 226 (Thomson
Reuters Web of Science Social Science Citation Index).
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(Roberts, 1990b). Through the application of both theories, I aim to take a well-balanced
approach to the causes of the disaster that considers both social and technical contributors to the
spill.

Indicators and Criteria
A table of concepts, indicators, and criteria for normal accident theory and high reliability
theory are provided on the following pages to illustrate the concepts presented above as applied
throughout this thesis. The author has hypothesized criteria to determine the severity of these
concepts in accident causation drawing on application of both theories to case studies and
industries.
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Figure 1: Author-Identified Concepts, Indicators, and Criteria of Normal Accident Theory
Normal Accident Theory
Concepts
Indicators
Criteria
Subject accident is a
Complexity • Proximity of parts or units that are not in a
‘normal’ or ‘system’
production sequence
accident = 50% concept
• Many common mode connections between
components (parts, units, or subsystems) not indicators linked to
complexity and tight
in a production sequence
coupling, collectively.
• Unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops
• Many control parameters with potential
Significant factors =
interactions
25% or more concept
• Indirect or inferential information sources
indicators linked to one
• Limited understanding of some processes
concept.
Tight
• Delays in processing not possible
Coupling • Invariant sequences11
• Only one method to achieve goal
• Little slack possible in supplies, equipment,
personnel
• Buffers and redundancies are designed-in,
deliberate
• Substitutions of supplies, equipment,
personnel limited and designed in
Indicators drawn from Perrow, 1999: 85-96.

11

“Invariant sequences” as defined by Perrow, refers to the notion that some highly technical processes can
only be carried out through a specific sequence of steps in order. Perrow uses the contrast between the
assembly of an aircraft (which has a variable sequence) to the generation of energy from a nuclear reaction
(which has an invariant sequence) to illustrate this quality (Perrow, 1999: 93-94).
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Figure 2: Author Identified Concepts, Indicators, and Criteria of High Reliability Theory
High Reliability Theory
Concepts
Indicators
Criteria
Lack of
Not a leading factor in the
• Organization does not adjust its
Organizational
spill = Less than 10% of
procedures and routines over time to
Learning
decisions /action indicate
evolve with challenges
a lack of organizational
• Organization does not learn from errors
learning
or accident simulation
• Organization does not conduct thorough
Significant factor = 10%
accident investigations
or more
• Organizational hubris is apparent in a
lack of accident imagination or foresight
• System managers fail to identify parts of
the system that should have redundancies
Lack of
Not a leading factor in the
• Elites and system managers do not
Prioritization
prioritize safety over short term profit or spill = Less than 10% of
of Safety
efficiency and production is valued at the decisions /actions
indicate a lack of
expense of safety
prioritization of safety
• Incentive systems do not reward safety
and instead may reward profit or
Significant factor = 10%
efficiency
or more
• Publicly stated safety goals do not
coincide with operating culture
Lack of
Not a leading factor in the
• Organization does not assign
adequate
spill = Less than 10% of
responsibility and accountability to low
organizational
level employees, adheres to a hierarchical decisions /actions
culture
indicate a lack of
structure
adequate organizational
• Lower level operators do not have
culture
authority to make safety decisions
• Decision-makers do not defer to experts
• Organization does not facilitate open and Significant factor = 10%
or more
free communication
• A homogeneous set of assumptions and
premises does not exist between workers
and common operating procedures are
not used or enforced
• Authority structure does not
accommodate centralization and
decentralization simultaneously
• Organization does not conduct exercises
or simulations on an ongoing basis
• Organization does not train employees to
recognize and respond to anomalies
Indicators drawn from: Sagan, 1993:14-27, Roberts and Bea, 2001, Roberts, 1990a,
Roberts, 1990b, Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001: 10-17.
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Development of Criteria
A normal accident is an accident caused by the confluence of complexity and
coupling within a sociotechnical system. Based on this premise, I have determined that the
2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill can only adequately be described as a normal accident
if the identified concept indicators for complexity and coupling collectively signify 50% or
more of the total number of concept indicators. By this logic, a level of 25% or above of
total concept indicators for complexity or coupling would indicate a significant level of this
quality within the subject sociotechnical system. Alternatively, many of Perrow’s analyses
of accidents within industrial processes include high levels of either complexity or coupling
within a system (47-57 % of listed causal factors). Without both of these attributes,
however, these systems do not produce ‘normal accidents’ and instead demonstrate
accidents that were either predictable (not complex) or allowed for recovery from failure
(not tightly coupled)12. This possibility points to the notion that the important criterion in
measuring these concepts is their collective ability to describe the cause of an accident.

Because high reliability theorists strive toward creating organizational capacity to
nearly eliminate accidents, I have set the criteria by which to determine the degree to
which an accident is caused by one of these concepts at relatively low levels. A main tenet
of high reliability theory is strict adherence to these principles and constant vigilance,
indicating that if an organization owes even a small percentage of its failure to these

12

The examples of these types of systems set forth in Perrow’s 1999 publication are that of a dam failure
(low complexity, tight coupling) and a dispute between students and a university over tenure policy (high
complexity, loose coupling). These examples can be found in Perrow, 1999: 98-99, 232-241, and an analysis
of the levels of complexity and coupling in these examples can be found in Appendix B, Figure 2, p. 121.
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concepts, this is a significant lack of reliability within the organization (Roberts, 1990b; La
Porte and Consolini, 1991).

Accident Reports in Application
In my analysis of causes of the 2010 blowout, I will rely heavily on the September 14,
2011 “Report Regarding the Causes of the April 20, 2010 Macondo Well Blowout” by the
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE) and the 2011
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling Chief
Counsel’s Report, “Macondo: The Gulf Oil Disaster,” known hereafter as the “BOEMRE report”
and the “National Commission Report.”

I have selected the BOEMRE report to analyze the technical failings that led to the 2010
spill, as this report follows a strong cause and event chain and thoroughly details both
mechanical failures and failures in decision-making made by the crew and management of the
Deepwater Horizon. This report is well organized and chronologically details the failures on the
rig leading to the 2010 blowout. This report summarizes the technical findings of the Joint
Investigation Team made up of appointed members of BOEMRE, the BOEMRE Investigative
Review Unit, and the U.S. Coast Guard. The report draws from the findings of expert analyses of
the blowout protector stack (conducted by Det Norske Veritas), the well condition data
(conducted by Dr. John Smith -Petroleum Consulting LLC), buoyancy analysis (conducted by
Keystone Engineering), and cement blend analysis (conducted by Oilfield Testing and
Consulting). Finally, this report is useful because it designates specific causes, contributing
causes, and possible contributing causes of the blowout based on these technical findings. The
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2011 BOEMRE report is the most comprehensive and authoritative report on the disasters
technical causes to date.

Although the BOEMRE report appears to be an accurate recount of the technical failings
aboard the Deepwater Horizon, it should be noted that this report has been published by the very
agency (MMS, now BOEMRE) that regulated deep water drilling permits and safety within the
Gulf of Mexico at the time of the spill, and continues in this task, indicating a possible source of
error in the collected data13. The 2011 report, however, is not the sole work of BOEMRE. The
authorship of the report is credited to the Joint Investigation Team and the U.S. Coast Guard. It is
not surprising, in light of the authorship of this report, that the report deals mainly with
identifying failures by BP and its partners and contractors rather than pointing to regulatory or
systematic failure.

I have selected the National Commission report to supplement the BOEMRE report
because it places a larger emphasis on the organizational and regulatory failure that led to the
2010 spill. This report, released to the President, is geared toward a systematic approach to the
spill including a thorough examination of the regulatory regime surrounding the event. Although
this report does not designate specific actions or decisions as causes, contributing causes, or
possible contributing causes, it does imply that some decisions weighed more heavily in the
accident than others, and this has been taken into consideration in my analysis of these actions or
decisions. The National Commission report is the most comprehensive and authoritative report
available to date on the social causes of the 2010 oil spill.
13

The reorganization of MMS to BOEMRE included a separation of promotion/lease sales and safety enforcement,
so these functions may be significantly more separate than they were at the time of the spill (“Reorganization of The
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement”).
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The National Commission was formed by executive order shortly following the spill, and
was made up of members of the federal government from different agencies including the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, as well as members of
nongovernmental organizations such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (National
Commission…, 2011e). Due to the varied background of the commission members, one can
surmise that the report does not hail from a single agency with a unified purpose, and may
include perspectives beyond that of BP and its direct regulatory counterparts (Goode, 2010;
Boesch, 2010; “The Antidrilling Commission”).

Both of the reports used in this analysis lend themselves to classification as reflexive,
rather than innovative “lessons learned” documents, meaning that they offer findings and
recommendations that are specifically linked to the event on April 20, 2010, and therefore do not
attempt to anticipate future accident possibilities or consider the deep water drilling industry as a
whole (Flournoy, 2011). This is an important distinction, as scholars have argued that reflexive
documents rarely serve to increase safety within a sociotechnical system, as they merely serve to
reinforce methods in preventing repetitive disasters of the same type or to demonstrate that
something has been done about the disaster (Flournoy, 2011; Birkland, 2009). This reflexiveness,
however, does not impede the goal of this thesis, which focuses on whether or not the accident
could have been prevented within the existing sociotechnical system. Without such detailed
documents that focus on the issues leading to the 2010 spill, I would not have had the data with
which to conduct my analysis.
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Chapter 4: Research Findings
The primary finding of this thesis is that the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon spill was not
preventable given the existing sociotechnical system. Based on a thorough analysis of the social
and technical causes of the spill, and in accordance with the selected indicators and criteria, the
Deepwater Horizon accident was the result of a moderate level of complex interactions and a
significant level of coupling, resulting in a system accident. Further, the organizations in control
of this technology were unable to cope with these characteristics due to an insufficient
prioritization of safety, and an inadequate organizational culture within the sociotechnical
system. The results of this analysis and a detailed explanation of each result are included in
Appendix B, Figure 1 p. 91. A summary of these results is included below.

Causal Factor

Theoretical Characterization: NAT / HRT Concept
Complexity

Concept
Indicators
Percentage

113
100

27
23.9

Coupling

Lack of
Org.
Learning

33
29.2

6
5.3

Lack of
Safety
Priority

18
15.9

Other

Inadequate
Org.
Culture

22
19.5

7
6.2

Complexity and Coupling
In analyzing the causes of the 2010 spill in terms of normal accident theory concepts
(complexity and coupling), the critical threshold to determine whether or not the accident was
“normal” is the indication that at least 50% of the causes of the spill were conceptually linked to
complexity or coupling. If the accident causes meet or exceed this threshold, it can be
determined that the accident was very likely to happen due to the complexity and coupling
within the system.

43

As seen in the above chart, the causal factors that led to the 2010 Deepwater Horizon
blowout and spill can be described as exhibiting a moderate level of complexity (23.9%) and a
significant level of coupling (29.2 %). That this accident can accurately be labeled a normal
accident because complexity and coupling accounted for 53.1% of the concept indicators listed
as causal factors of the spill within the sociotechnical system.

The system in question is complex in many ways, including technical interconnectedness,
a reliance on indirect information sources, and unexpected interactions within processes, a large
portion of which are attributable to the unpredictable environment in which deep water drilling
takes place (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). Deep water oil drilling is also a
tightly coupled process, a characteristic that is largely a product of its process location which is
on a vessel that is a hybrid between a nautical vessel and an oil derrick, complete with the
immediate risks of the marine environment and highly combustible materials released under
great pressure (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). Other aspects of the deep
water oil drilling process that lend themselves to tight coupling include tight drilling margins, a
reliance on early and accurate detection of well ‘kicks’ and well flow, as well as the ability for
combustible gas to trigger an explosion (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011)14.

It is important to note, in consideration of the effect of coupling on the resulting accident,
that many tightly coupled relationships that directly contributed to the blowout describe the

14

Perrow’s 1999 publication features a visual representation of industries’ relative degree complexity and
coupling according to the author’s assessment (Perrow, 1999: 97). As dictated by the findings to follow this
paragraph, I have estimated a location on this chart that corresponds to the relative degree of complexity and
coupling present within the Deepwater Horizon system at the time of the 2010 spill. This chart is featured in
Appendix B, Figure 3, page 123.
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interfaces between human operators and decision-makers and technology. Examples include the
decision to use the mud gas separator during the blowout event, which was tightly coupled to the
presence of gas on the rig and thus to the subsequent explosion (U.S. Department of the Interior /
BOEMRE, 2011). Examples of the relationship also include mechanical signals that were missed
or misinterpreted by operators, leading to catastrophe, such as the failure of the well crew to
recognize the signs of a well kick in a timely manner and the collective misinterpretation of the
negative test results. These two human failures are directly linked with mechanical failures
triggering the blowout and explosion on the Deepwater Horizon (U.S. Department of the Interior
/ BOEMRE, 2011).

Reliability Factors
The goal of analyzing the causes of the 2010 spill in terms of high reliability theory
concepts is to determine whether or not the organizational system (including BP, MMS, etc.) was
performing as a high reliability organization. The critical threshold here is the indication that at
least 10% of the causes of the spill were conceptually linked to the absence of a high reliability
concept (organizational learning, safety prioritization, or organizational culture). If the accident
causes meet or exceed this threshold, it can be determined that the accident was not likely to
have been prevented or controlled by the organizational system because it was unable to function
as a high reliability organization.

As seen in the summary chart on page 42, the identified causal factors can be described
as being slightly attributed to a lack of organizational learning (5.3 %), however a lack of safety
prioritization (15.9 %) and an inadequate organizational culture (19.5 %) were more significant
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factors in the 2010 spill. These results indicate that BP, its operating partners, and the Minerals
Management Service were not functioning together as a high reliability system, and they
collectively lacked two critical traits of high reliability, that of a prioritization of safety and an
adequate organizational culture. This lack of reliability in the subject sociotechnical system
greatly contributed to the cause of the 2010 spill.

There existed a cultural dominance of cost and production pressures that weighed in
decisions made at all levels of power within BP15 (Lustgarten, 2012: 22-23, 45,49), and was
likely thoroughly instilled in operators and managers over time, as seen in the many decisions
atop the Deepwater Horizon rig16 (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011; Deepwater
Horizon Study Group, 2011; Pritchard and Kotow, 2010). In this example of a profit conscious
workplace culture, one could easily imagine that managers and operators were tacitly aware of
cost and production pressures and may have felt pressured from company leaders to work outside
the margins of safety to maintain a secure bottom line. Although litigation is still ongoing
surrounding the 2010 spill, some reports indicate that this prevailing cost-conscious culture
deeply impacted BP’s ability to prevent the spill (The Times-Picayune, 2013).

The organizational structure controlling the operation of the Macondo well stands as an
example of a collective failure to prevent, comprehend, or address risk within the sociotechnical
system. The operations within the team on the Deepwater Horizon appeared to have a measure of
15

Some examples of this concept can be seen in the decisions implicated as causal factors in the 2005
explosion at BP’s Texas City Refinery, as well as a 2006 leak of 212,000 gallons of oil in Alaska’s North Slope
from a BP maintained pipeline. Both of these events are detailed thoroughly in Lustgarten, 2012: 120-203.
16 Some of these decisions include “not waiting for more centralizers of preferred design,” “not running the
cement evaluation log,” and using lost circulation material as a spacer (listed in National Commission…,
2011c). These decisions all raised risk levels on the rig and saved time or operational costs (National
Commission…, 2011c).
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decentralization built into them (for emergent situations). However, as demonstrated by the
existence of a “stop work order,” in which well operators could demand that work on a well be
stopped if they feel work is contributing to an accident situation (U.S. Department of the Interior
/ BOEMRE, 2011). I argue, based on the above-cited examples, that cost and production
pressures primarily and almost exclusively guided the actions of the operations team on the rig
and their corporate counterparts in Houston.

Cost and production pressures are not unique to BP. Several authors have recognized a
trend in hydrocarbon extraction firms toward riskier and more expensive technological
processes, questionable financial reporting practices, and increased involvement with unreliable
political regimes in search of “proved reserves” that is fiscally justified by rising oil prices (Coll,
2012: 50-56; Boman, 2012; Lustgarten, 2012:7-13, 52; National Commission…, 2011b). The
connection between cost and production pressures and a decrease in safety buffers to large-scale
accidents is clear in the case study of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill. This aligns with theories
about safety within complex industries and specifically within the deep water drilling industry
(Hofmann and Stetzer, 1996; Pritchard and Kotow, 2010; Perrow, 1994; Perrow, 1999: 118,
146, 175-176, 180; Heimann, 1993)

BP was undergoing a multitude of management changes and reassignments during the
months leading up to the spill, thereby fragmenting and obfuscating responsibility, placing new
operators in unfamiliar positions, and facilitating friction between operation leaders (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). In addition to this managerial confusion, BP
operated the Macondo well and Deepwater Horizon in collaboration with Transocean (its
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primary contractor), Halliburton, MI-SWACO, Schlumberger, and Sperry Drilling. This led to
fragmentation of responsibility and a severe lack of communications between BP and its
contractors (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). Finally, operations surrounding
the temporary abandonment of the Macondo well were woefully understaffed, thus distracting
operators’ attention from critical monitoring duties and pressing staff into multiple simultaneous
duties. This eliminated operational capacity to address any unexpected events at the well (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).

It should be noted that before the 2010 spill, BP generally regarded itself as a responsible,
reliable organization, and touted its “Operating Management System” (OMS) as a significant
step toward risk reduction (BP, 2006). The results of this analysis refute this assertion, and are
accompanied by general opinion as expressed in an article by World Oil Online that asserted that
BP’s method of gauging safety and risk was flawed (World Oil Online, 2010).

Finally, the Minerals Management Service (now BOEMRE) clearly failed to prioritize
safety in regulating deep water drilling processes at the Macondo well. Perrow in his normal
accidents theory, notes that regulatory agencies operating under conflicting missions or
objectives face difficulties in effectively enforcing safety laws17 (Perrow, 1999: 157-159). The
Minerals Management Service (MMS) was a prime example of this dilemma, and some authors
assert that this stands as an example of regulatory capture (Flournoy, 2011; Sylves and Comfort,
2012; Plater, 2011). Many authors note that this organizational confusion is not completely
remedied by the reorganization of BOEMRE (effectively splitting responsibility for lease sales

17

Perrow, in his 1999 publication, uses the example of air traffic controllers, whose conflicting missions are
to decrease air collisions while increasing air traffic (Perrow, 1999: 156-158).
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and promotion of deep water drilling away from enforcement duties by creating two entities that
operate separately) (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, “Reorganization…”). Because
the United States relies heavily on hydrocarbon energy, a rational regulatory relationship that
effectively keeps the oil producing industries in check may not be possible (Flournoy, 2011;
Sylves and Comfort, 2012).

Finding 1: Inevitability of the 2010 Spill
Given the moderate degree of complex interactions and high degree of coupling,
accompanied by the significant lack of safety prioritization and inadequate organizational culture
within the subject sociotechnical system, one can conclude that the spill was not preventable. Not
only did there exist sufficient complexity and coupling to cause a major accident within the
system, but the social structure of control over this technology also severely failed to cope with
this inherent danger through the prioritization of safety and creation of a culture of prevention.
The primary research question is now answered, based on applying normal accident theory and
high reliability theory to the data in the two selected reports: No, the oil spill was not
preventable; it was a normal accident (for full analysis results, see p. 91). Further, BP and its
operating partners and regulators did not exercise adequate vigilance in the form of safety
prioritization and organizational culture to adequately cope with the complexity and coupling
inherent in the subject sociotechnical system, thereby increasing the inevitability of the oil spill.

Finding 1a: Theoretical Applicability
Sub-question a) of this thesis posed the question “Do normal accident theory and high
reliability theory apply to the 2010 BP oil spill?” In my selection of a theoretical framework to
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apply to this event, I considered a range of approaches. Many technical analyses of similar
industrial accidents follow a root cause analysis or decision tree model to arrive at causal
relationships in accident events (Leveson, 2004), while other theoretical approaches consider
quantitative risk probability (Ji et. al., 2012). I chose to employ two methods of accident
analysis, however, that were grounded in organizational theory, and therefore could qualitatively
describe the technical and organizational characteristics leading to the oil spill. Both of these
approaches are highly cited, as previously mentioned, and apply to a broad range of
contemporary industrial accidents when employed together.

Although normal accident theory and high reliability theory are not without their faults,
this thesis has used both theories in tandem in order to address many of these issues. Because
normal accident theory lacks measurable indicators for cost and production pressures as well as
organizational weakness, I have supplemented the indicators of complexity and coupling with
those of organizational learning, safety prioritization, and organizational culture; drawn from
high reliability theory. Similarly, because high reliability theory does not address inherent
technical characteristics of a system that exist despite managements’ best efforts, I have
supplemented this theory with the indicators of complexity and coupling drawn from normal
accident theory.

Although this thesis attempts to set forth criteria to measure the effect of these indicators
on accident causation, the critique that normal accident theory and high reliability theory do not
provide objective measurable criteria by which to judge the degree of their concepts within a
system holds true. Because the concepts within both theories are somewhat ethereal, a concrete
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application of these concepts is difficult to establish. Further, this thesis does not fully resolve
the larger issues of non-falsifiability inherent within both theories. This thesis does, however,
aim to add to a developing body of work featuring measurable applications of normal accident
theory and high reliability theory to events18, with the intention to contribute to the formation of
standard indicators and criteria by which to objectively analyze accidents within sociotechnical
systems.

Finding 1 a (i): Theoretical Coverage
Based on my analysis of the causal factors of the 2010 spill, I can conclude that these two
theories, employed simultaneously, effectively characterize a large majority of the causal factors
in the spill. Out of the 113 concept indicators identified in the two reports, only 7 signified a
concept outside of the realm of normal accident theory or high reliability theory. Of these
concept indicators, 60 (53.1 %) signify complexity and coupling within the sociotechnical
system, indicating that the oil spill was a normal accident. Further, 46 (40.7 %) of these concept
indicators showed a lack of reliability within the organizations in charge of the Deepwater
Horizon and Macondo well, which were incapable of coping with this degree of complexity and
tight coupling within the system. These results are shown below.
Theory Applicability
Concept
Indicators
113
Percentage
100

Normal Accident

High Reliability

60
53.1

Other
46
40.7

18

7
6.2

Wolf and Sampson have made significant progress in this endeavor with respect to normal accident theory
– see Wolf, 2001 and Wolf and Sampson, 2007.
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Finding 1 a (ii): Theory Symbiosis
Because the three most significant concepts implicated in the cause of the spill (coupling
(29.2 %), lack of safety priority (15.9 %), and inadequate organizational culture (19.5 %)) are
rooted in normal accident theory and high reliability theory, respectively, neither of these
theories is sufficient to describe the 2010 spill when employed in isolation. For example, to
describe the spill as simply a ‘normal accident’ with tight coupling and medium complexity (the
meaning of “normal” as defined by Perrow) would miss significant organizational causes of the
spill including cost and production pressures and a failure of management to adequately train
operators to deal with loss of well control events. Similarly, to claim that the spill was singularly
caused by a failure of management would be to ignore the uncertain environment and tight safety
margins inherent in deep water drilling processes. For this reason, I contend that this application
of both theories to the causal factors of the 2010 spill is necessary to describe both the technical
and social factors that created a sociotechnical system unable to harness the destructive power of
the Macondo well. The answer to sub-question 1a is yes; normal accident theory and high
reliability theory are applicable to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, however both of these
theories are necessary to adequately describe the structural and organizational causal factors of
the oil spill.

Finding 1 b: Indicators and Criteria
A thorough list of indicators and criteria used in this analysis are featured on pages 37-38.
The indicators used to operationalize the concepts of normal accident theory and high reliability
theories were numerous and easily recognized within the narratives of the accident reports. The
criteria used in this analysis designated various degrees of influence of each concept, and were
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calibrated through an analysis of normal accident and high reliability theorists’ application of
their respective concepts to narratives of various accidents.

Many systems examined by Perrow (1999) feature either complexity or coupling in high
degrees (43-57 % causal factors of accidents), yet do not have ‘normal accidents.’ This appears
to be due to the fact that a ‘normal accident’ refers to an accident in which complexity and
coupling are both signified in causal factors. Based on this argument, set forth by Perrow, I
concluded that an accident can only truly be labeled a ‘normal accident’ if complexity and
coupling (collectively) are linked to 50% or more of its identified causal factors.

I selected criteria to establish causal relationships between a lack of high reliability
factors and the 2010 oil spill at a lower rate than that of normal accident theory based on the
notion, asserted by high reliability theorists, that organizations must be constantly and
impeccably vigilant to maintain reliability (La Porte and Consolini, 1991; Roberts, 1990b;
Roberts and Bea, 2001). As a reflection of this assertion, I concluded that a lack of a high
reliability concept linked to under 10 % of concept indicators could be considered a slight lapse
in vigilance, while any connection higher than 10% represents a significant divergence from the
tenets of high reliability.

In my analysis, I estimate that the applied indicators and criteria adequately gauge the
effect of normal accident theory and high reliability theory concepts on causal factors of the
2010 spill. Because my criteria were drawn from narrative applications of these theories,
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however, further application of normal accident theory and high reliability theory concepts to
similar disasters is needed to accurately set criteria for accident prediction.

54

Chapter 5: Policy Recommendations
The analysis contained in this thesis features two broad normative concepts by which to
draft policy recommendations: technical accident potential and organizational capability to cope
with risks (represented by normal accident theory and high reliability theory, respectively). The
2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill stands as a clear example of a sociotechnical system with
relatively high inherent accident potential combined with extremely poor organizational
capability to cope with this risk. In this final section of this thesis, I urge policymakers to
consider these two dimensions in technological accident prevention and in the construction of
new regulations addressing deep water drilling.

Performance-Based v. Prescriptive Regulation
Studies conducted after the 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill concerned with regulatory
action cite the examples of Norway and the U.K. in enacting “safety case19” requirements that
place risk assessment duties in the responsibility of the operator of deep water drilling rigs
(National Commission…, 2011a; Scarlett et. al., 2011). Safety case requirements are clearly
more adaptive to different operations and exercise a performance-based method of regulation, as
opposed to U.S. regulations which are largely prescriptive (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2012). This
method has been criticized, however, as “self-regulation” and runs the risk of eventually
becoming a rote task performed by a small pool of contractors (National Commission…, 2011a).
Further, some analysts have noted that, as valuable as a “safety case” requirement is in
anticipating risk, this method may ignore the human and organizational factors in deep water
19

These “safety case” requirements refer to a comprehensive risk analysis required by Norwegian and U.K.
regulators to be conducted and submitted by a drilling company. This system requires the company to assess
all risks affiliated with the requested action and demonstrate risk reduction methods and response capacity
to reach specific safety levels set by regulators. In this system, regulators oversee compliance with agreed
upon methods set forth by the drilling company to maintain a low level of risk (Scarlett et. al., 2011).
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drilling and may simply focus on technical safety barriers, which are in fact dependent on
organizational capacity. One example is the engagement of safety barriers such as a BOP in a
well control event, which is dependent upon human interpretation of signals of well kicks and
flow, and therefore is rendered useless if not activated properly (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2012).

Another issue with drawing a contrast between the U.S. and Norway or the U.K. is the
wide gap in accident rates between countries that exercise the two methods. This gap is partially
explained by deep water oil wells in the Gulf that are inherently more risky than those found
elsewhere, largely because of their high pressure and high gas formations, which create slim
drilling margins (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2012). However, this gap is also likely due to the lack
of required barriers against well blowout required by U.S. regulators in comparison to those in
Norway (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2012).

Changes to liability laws and permitting processes within BOEMRE have been suggested
in the wake of the 2010 spill (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011; National
Academy of Engineering and National Research Council, 2012; Peterson et. al., 2012; Galligan,
Jr., 2012) and will help in addressing the issues presented by the 2010 Deepwater Horizon
accident. But my results suggest that any regulatory change that does not address cost and
production pressures by instituting strict safety standards and risk analysis (even at the risk of
slowing operations and thereby production to the global market) will fail to enact real change in
the deep water drilling industry. As indicated by my results, a certain level of complexity and
coupling within the system of deep water drilling is unavoidable. However, organizational
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failures prompted by cost and production pressures increase the risk of accidents even further by
reducing safety prioritization.

Deep Water Drilling in the Gulf of Mexico
Political forces weigh in all decisions in fuel production in the U.S., namely that of high
powered lobbying forces pushing for looser regulation and the expansion of fossil fuel operations
to increasingly risky and sensitive frontiers and a general lack of prioritization of development of
alternative fuels for mass consumption (Plater, 2011). One major issue in the effective regulation
of the oil industry lies in the fact that as oil prices increase, companies are incentivized to
undertake increasingly risky and expensive operations to reach hydrocarbon formations that were
previously untapped due to the prohibitive cost of extracting oil from them (Coll, 2012: 50-56;
Boman, 2012; Lustgarten, 2012:7-13, 52; National Commission…, 2011b).

As drilling companies set their sights on the Gulf of Mexico and the Arctic (Handwerk,
2011), regulators will be hard pressed to prevent these new technologies from operating in
increasingly hazardous frontiers that abut extremely sensitive ecological resources. Critics of the
previous regulatory regime of MMS have noted that a revolving door between industry and
regulators inhibited the power of the agency to demand increases in safety and may have
impacted the quality of safety reviews (National Commission…, 2011a). Further, the severely
deficient budget of MMS has clearly been a factor in preventing adequate regulatory capacity,
indicating that an inability to offer competitive wages to regulators may create an imbalance in
staff capability and lead professionals toward industry positions (National Commission..., 2011a.
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Numerous reports surrounding the 2010 spill note that the hydrocarbon formations in the
deep water of the Gulf of Mexico present unconquered challenges in terms of drilling margin and
the intense pressure and heat at which its hydrocarbons circulate (Skogdalen and Vinnem, 2012;
National Commission…, 2011d). This is the most critical technological problem in terms of
regulating oil exploration in the Gulf of Mexico. The harsh environment and unique geologic
formations of the Gulf of Mexico, coupled with the vast ecologically sensitive areas in the Gulf,
upon which millions of residents depend directly and indirectly, leads to significantly more risk
of failure and higher levels of catastrophic damage associated with accidents. The fact that the
unique environment of the Gulf of Mexico presents this challenge invites the question of whether
drilling in this unique environment can be regulated to a point of safety acceptable to society.

Liability
One important factor in the regulation of dangerous technologies is assigning and
enforcing liability after an accident. Many have critiqued the National Resource Damage
Assessment process (put forth by the OPA 90 laws) in the aftermath of the 2010 Deepwater
Horizon spill, claiming that it is not suited for use in deep water spills and citing slow and
conflicting processes that require the government and responsible party to agree on the validity
of damage studies (Peterson et. al., 2012; NRDC, 2011). One issue to consider in addressing
liability issues in deep water drilling is that of drilling firms’ ability to pay liability assigned for
spills.

Current laws require companies to prove that they are able to take on the financial
liability to drill, however the current cap on financial liability allows small firms to enter the
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drilling field (National Commission…, 2011b). True liability reform should ideally ignore this
barrier to entry and require verification that firms are not only financially able to cover the
liability costs of a spill but also that these firms are physically equipped with the equipment and
staff capacity to clean up spills quickly. Many authors have agreed with this approach, largely
influenced by the relatively larger scale of hydrocarbons at risk of blowout in deep water drilling
operations (Richardson, 2011; National Commission…, 2011b).

Public Participation
One suggestion applicable to the Gulf of Mexico is participation of those affected by
spills through the use of a Regional Citizen Advisory Council (RCAC). This concept was hailed
by Zygmunt Plater, the Chairman of the State of Alaska Oil Spill Commission’s Legal Task
Force, and put into place in Alaska following the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill to resolve the
dipolar20 system of regulation of the oil industry (Plater, 2011). These councils have assisted in
advancing safety precautions in oil industry operations along the Alaska coast, and have
facilitated whistleblowing from within the firms and government agencies (Plater, 2011).

Plater notes that because many residents of the Gulf coast are highly dependent on the
waters of the Gulf for their livelihoods, these residents would have likely demanded more
information and safety precautions from offshore drilling processes had they been allotted any
measure of authority in the form of a citizen council (Plater, 2011). Although citizen
participation is always an important factor in decision-making about natural resources, one
20

Plater’s description of a "di-polar" system is one “where industry and government regulators come too
close together, [and] responsible overall management of operations and risks suffers (Plater, 2011).” Plater
further remarks that this type of system does not delegate any decision making power to residents affected
by oil spills.
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critical component of the effective operation of an RCAC is some form of legally allotted veto
power or influence over dangerous activities, rather than simply providing citizens a sounding
board through which to be heard. It should be noted, however, that this type of regulatory body
would likely not assist in avoiding system accidents caused by inherent complexity and coupling,
therefore rendering these councils useless against system errors and only effective against poor
management practices and corporate influence.

Recommendation 1:
Restrain Gulf drilling to a specific quota or low level to be decreased yearly in order to
phase out this highly accident prone operation. Continue the moratorium until reliance on
hydrocarbons is decreased or until technological and organizational advancements in deep water
drilling improve the ability to foresee and prevent loss of well control events.

Flournoy et. al. (2010) encourage technological advancement and less subsidization of
deep water drilling in their recommendations based on the 2010 BP oil spill, however these
authors do not directly urge for mass reduction in deep water drilling activities in the Gulf. Few
authors urge the complete phasing out of this technology21, likely due to the economic benefit
that this technology provides. An application of normal accident theory to the 2010 oil spill,
however, indicates that this event was a normal accident and was therefore unpreventable.
Although technological advancements and stricter regulation may reduce some level of
organizational failure and complexity within the subject system, it is not inconceivable that a
similar chain of events could take place at another well site within the Gulf of Mexico. The only

21

U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011 and Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011 are two
prominent reports that do not recommend the phasing out of this technology.
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way to truly reduce this risk is to phase out this technology that is inherently risky. Phasing out
this technology would directly address the inevitability of another spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

Recommendation 2:
Adopt performance-based regulations similar to those exercised by Norway and the U.K.
Recommendation 2 (a):
These regulations should include requirements for multiple safety barriers against well
blowouts.
Recommendation 2 (b):
These regulations should address the prevalence of contract workers in the deep water
drilling industry through more effective labor laws and clear assignment of responsibility.

Scarlett et. al., 2011 as well as National Commission…, 2011a are two reports that
recommend the adoption of performance-based regulations within the U.S. offshore oil
regulations. This is an immediate solution that would address the lack of regulatory capacity
within the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management. The adoption of a “safety case” requirement
would likely encourage oil drilling companies within the Gulf of Mexico to practice increased
organizational learning and may assist in fostering the prioritization of safety goals within the
deep water drilling community. Ideally, these new regulations would include additional required
barriers to well blowouts, as advocated by Skogdalen and Vinnem (2012). Finally, these new
regulations should adequately address the assignment of responsibility within deep water drilling
operators, specifically because many of these operations include numerous contractors under
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different managers, which can diffuse accountability (Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011;
Rebitzer, 1995).

Recommendation 3:
Change the funding structure of BOEMRE in order to enable the agency to hire the
highly trained professionals needed to adequately analyze industry information and conduct
inspections.

As demonstrated by my analysis, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation,
and Enforcement was not contributing to high reliability within the subject sociotechnical
system. This agency clearly lacked an adequate organizational culture and the ability to prioritize
safety and conduct organizational learning in April 2010. The addition of experts and adequate
funding, as advocated in U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011; Flournoy et. al.,
2010; and Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011 would serve to address these issues.

Recommendation 4:
Remove the liability cap on oil spill claims made through the OPA 90 and Clean Water
Act.

Changes to existing liability regulations as urged by Richardson, 2011 and National
Commission…, 2011b may address the lack of prioritization of safety exemplified in the 2010
BP oil spill, by transferring a larger portion of the cost of oil spills directly to drilling companies
and their insurers.
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Recommendation 5:
Create and fund Regional Citizen Advisory Councils (RCACs) to oversee offshore
drilling activities in the Gulf of Mexico with review powers over permitting processes, new
proposals, and safety requirements specific to the Gulf of Mexico.

Plater (2011) recommends the introduction of RCACs to the Gulf of Mexico region to
balance the competing needs of industry and the environment. The introduction of citizen
concerns into the decision making process surrounding deep water drilling permits and proposals
may increase the prioritization of safety within this organizational system, thus improving its
reliability by considering the needs of those directly affected by oil spills.

Suggestions for Further Research:
Because deep water drilling regulations and permitting processes have undergone
significant changes in the wake of the 2010 spill, I suggest that further study question whether
post-spill changes to the sociotechnical system make catastrophic oil spills more preventable. A
thorough application of the concepts of normal accident theory and high reliability theory to
post-spill improvements would be enlightening. Accident reports, reports of near misses, and the
operations of companies drilling within the Gulf of Mexico could be used as data. And the
indicators utilized in this thesis may contribute to understanding the effectiveness of those
changes.
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Recommendation 6:
Apply normal accident theory and high reliability theory to similar accidents in order to
cross-validate criteria. Employ additional methods such as multiple raters and tests of
significance with non-parametric statistics to further hone the measurability and applicability of
normal accident theory and high reliability theory concepts to actual events and organizations.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
The events of April 20, 2010 reminded the citizens of the United States that the nation’s
ocean floor holds unbridled power that can overwhelm modern technology. This event also
reminded the citizens of the Gulf Coast that a fearsome and risky endeavor takes place on their
doorstep and can threaten their livelihoods, health, and property in an instant if not adequately
controlled. Control, however, currently lies in the hands of imperfect organizations working
within the margins of safety and profit which are, in some instances, regulated by a set of rules
set in the past that are not adequately enforced in the present. Local residents feel this conflict
between the harvesting of natural resources for export and the preservation of the economy and
productive coastal ecosystem of the Gulf coast personally.

My analysis shows that the sociotechnical system controlling the Deepwater Horizon and
the Macondo well on April 20, 2010 was indeed complex and tightly coupled, and further that
this system was not organized optimally to respond to disaster risk. The system was hampered by
cost and production pressures and was poorly guided by an ineffective regulatory regime. This
event, in my estimate, fits the description of a system accident as outlined by normal accident
theory and high reliability theory. A system accident portends more accidents of its kind in the
future, granted sociotechnical conditions in the future meet these criteria. It appears that the
Macondo well was not an anomaly in the Gulf of Mexico. It was similar to some other well sites
in the region in terms of geologic demands and conditions for drilling. My analysis also shows
that the organizational structure of the Deepwater Horizon could conceivably be adopted by
other drilling rigs within the Gulf of Mexico, thus enabling missed well kicks and misinterpreted
signals to taint what may otherwise be a safe drilling endeavor. Many factors signaling
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complexity, tight coupling, and organizational inadequacy within the 2010 BP system could be
in widespread use, potentially creating a situation in which oil spills of a large magnitude in the
Gulf of Mexico are not only possible, but more likely in the future.

Finally, I conclude that deep water drilling in this area should be restricted in order to
reduce the catastrophic risk presented to the abutting communities and ecosystems, who do not
proportionally benefit from such endeavors. In considering future lease sales and regulations for
the outer continental shelf, lawmakers should consider the practical inevitability of future
catastrophic oil spills and make decisions based on realistic qualitative risk rather than
aspirational goals of failure-free operation.
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Appendix A
Working Definitions

Working Definition of Complexity
Perrow uses a multifaceted definition of complexity in a sociotechnical system. In his
section on complexity in his 1999 publication, Perrow indicates that “baffling interactions”
indicate the presence of complexity and that this complexity is often present in systems that
serve a diverse number of functions or that operate in “hostile environments” and are
interconnected with other systems (Perrow, 1999: 72). Three main components of complexity
within a system that Perrow identifies in his 1999 publication are multi-functionality22,
proximity23, and indirect information sources24 (Perrow 1999: 72-75). Perrow also notes that
“transformation processes,” those that “transform raw materials rather than fabricate or assemble
them” are often a source of complexity, which is not easily addressed by traditional approaches
to complex systems (aimed at making them more linear) such as better designs or operations
(Perrow 1999: 84-85). Finally, in his analysis of complexity, Perrow lists characteristics that
indicate complexity within a system including (Perrow, 1999: 85-86):

22

The common example of this characteristic is a “common mode” failure in which one component of a
system is designed to conduct two processes, in which a failure of that component triggers two separate
negative reactions, this is often exemplified by a heater which heats the gas in one tank while absorbing heat
from a chemical reactor – if the heater fails, both the tank and the reactor will experience an unstable
temperature– see Perrow 1999: 72-73 for more detail.
23 Perrow’s example of proximity as a characteristic in unforeseen interactions is that of an oil tanker accident
in which flammable gases, engine equipment, and leaking oil combined to create a fire and explosion due to
the proximity of oil storage near the engine room (Perrow 1999: 73-74).
24 Indirect information sources may include sources of information that are not properly calibrated or do not
measure parameters directly linked to critical information, or a reliance on gauges that replace visual
observation of critical components (Perrow 1999: 73, 82-83).
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•

Proximity of parts or units that are not in a production sequence;

•

many common mode connections between components (parts, units, or
subsystems) not in a production sequence;

•

unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops;

•

many control parameters with potential interactions

•

indirect or inferential information sources; and

•

limited understanding of some processes.

In his discussion of complexity, Perrow also lists several qualities of linear systems
including spatial segregation, “easy isolation of failed components,” “less personnel
specialization,” and “extensive substitution of supplies and materials (Perrow 1999: 88).”

Sagan (1993) derives his definition from Perrow, noting that “Interactive complexity is a
measure, not of a system’s overall size or the number of subunits that exist in it, but rather of the
way in which parts are connected and interact (Sagan, 1993: 78).” Sagan, in his consideration of
a nuclear power plant, notes that proximity, a multitude of coordinated processes being
conducted simultaneously, a limited understanding of some processes within the nuclear
industry, and indirect information sources are all factors indicating complexity within a system
(Sagan, 1993: 32-33).

Shrivastava et. al. (2009) echo Perrow’s concept of complexity as signified by
interactions that occur in unfamiliar, unplanned, or unexpected sequences; and which are either
not visible, not comprehensible, have multiple functionality, the physical proximity of
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components, require specialized knowledge of personnel (Shrivastava et. al., 2009 note that this
narrows operator’s awareness of interdependencies), have multiple control parameters, and may
require the deciphering of unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops (Shrivastava et. al., 2009).

Shrivastava et. al. add, however, that both complexity and coupling may be framed as
dependent variables affected by the amounts of energy levels involved in the organization’s
transformative processes and the gaps in knowledge about the processes. These authors suggest
that in analyzing the level of energy employed in a given transformative process, researchers also
consider the number of “interfaces” at which point inputs and outputs are changed or monitored
within complex systems (Shrivastava et. al., 2009). As asserted by Shrivastava et. al. (2009), my
analysis of the relative complexity and tight coupling of the system surrounding the 2010 spill
will include a consideration of the level of energy involved in the processes included in deep
water drilling. Finally, Shrivastava et. al. (2009) also describe complexity as a dynamic element
that is addressed through requisite variety of organizations (assigning adequate human capability
to complex tasks).

In my consideration of the 2011 BOEMRE report, I have decided that any operation,
process, or interaction that can be described by the above attributes of complexity will be
considered an indication of complexity within the subject system.

Working Definition of Coupling
Perrow describes coupling generally as the level of responsiveness between two
components in a system (Perrow, 1999: 90-91). Some facets of coupling that Perrow explores
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include time-dependent processes that may be utilized either for efficiency purposes or as
necessitated by the materials used in a industrial process (such as chemical reactions), invariant
sequences in production, sequences that may only be completed in one way (labeled as
“unifinality”), and a lack of “slack” in a system (leaving little room for substitution of processes
or materials) (Perrow, 1999: 93-94). Perrow notes that automatic safety devices are often
featured in tightly coupled systems and must be “designed in” to protect against time-dependent
failures that threaten the system and leave little room for human intervention in an emergency
(Perrow, 1999: 94-95). As with his description of complexity, Perrow accompanies his
description of tight coupling with a chart detailing the characteristics of tight coupling including
(Perrow, 1999: 96):
•

Delays in processing not possible

•

Invariant sequences

•

Only one method to achieve goal

•

Little slack possible in supplies, equipment, personnel

•

Buffers and redundancies are designed-in, deliberate

•

Substitutions of supplies, equipment, personnel limited and designed in

In this discussion, Perrow also lists some qualities of loosely coupled systems which
include such concepts as “processing delays possible,” “order of sequences can be changed,” and
“slack in resources possible.”

Sagan echoes these qualities of tight coupling and also notes that tight coupling “affects
[a system’s] ability to recover from small-scale failures before they cascade into larger problems
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(Sagan, 1993: 34).” Sagan also contrasts the workings of a university, which may be complex but
loosely coupling (allowing for scheduling changes and improvisation in reaction to errors) to that
of a nuclear power plant, in which a small error may propagate within the system quickly with
little slack for intervention or recovery (Sagan, 1993: 35-36).
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Appendix B
Fig. 1: Causes, Contributing Causes, and Possible Contributing Causes Classified by Normal
Accident Theory and High Reliability Theory Criteria
Note: all identified “Contributing Causes” are considered to be coupled to their respective effect,
while factors labeled “Possible Contributing Causes” are considered to have a weaker linkage to
subsequent events that cannot be unequivocally categorized as “coupling.” Some factors are not
clearly classifiable and signify multiple indicators of normal accident theory or high reliability
theory.
* = Causal factor identified in U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011
† = Causal factor identified in National Commission..., 2011c
Causes, Contributing Causes, and Possible Contributing Causes of the 2010 Spill
Causal Factor

Theoretical Characterization: NAT / HRT Concept
Complexity

1. Cause of the
Blowout: Failure of
shoe cement*
2. Contributing
Cause: Decision to
set the product casing
in a laminated sandshale zone in the
vicinity of a
hydrocarbon
interval*
3. Contributing
Cause: Failure to take
additional
precautions during
cementing
considering known
losses in the well*
4. Contributing
Cause: Failure to
perform production
casing cement job in
accordance with API
RP 65*

Coupling

Lack of
Org.
Learning

Lack of
Safety
Priority

Other

Inadequate
Org.
Culture

X

X

X

X

X

X

Divergence
from
accepted
practices
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Causal Factor

Fig. 1 Continued
Theoretical Characterization: NAT / HRT Concept
Complexity

5. Contributing
Cause: Decision to
set float collar across
the hydrocarbonbearing zones of
interest*
6. Contributing
Cause: Failure to
inform all parties
operating of the
known risks
associated with
Macondo well
operations*
7. Contributing
Cause: Failure to
appropriately
analyze/evaluate risks
associated with well*
8. Contributing
Cause: Failure to
place cement on top
of wiper plug*
9. Contributing
Cause: Decision to
use a float collar that
was not sufficiently
debris-tolerant*
10. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Decision to set casing
in the production
interval with known
drilling margin limits
at total depth*
11. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Lack of accurate and
reliable flow-line
sensors during
cementing
operations*

Coupling

Lack of
Org.
Learning

Lack of
Safety
Priority

X

Divergence
from
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practices

X

X

Other
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Org.
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X

X

X

X
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Fig. 1 Continued
Theoretical Characterization: NAT / HRT Concept
Complexity

Coupling

Lack of
Org.
Learning

Lack of
Safety
Priority

12. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Planning and
conducting
production casing
cement job*

X

X

13. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure of leaders and
crew to recognize
risks associated with
multiple problems
between 4/19-4/20*
14. Cause of the Well
Control Failure:
Failure of crew to
detect influx of
hydrocarbons until
they were above the
BOP stack*
15. Cause of the Well
Control Failure:
Crew’s collective
misinterpretation of
the negative tests*
16. Contributing
Cause: Crew’s
inability to accurately
monitor pit levels
while conducting
simultaneous
operations during the
critical negative test*
17. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure to perform an
incident investigation
into 3/8/10 well
control event and
delayed kick
detection*

X

X

Inadequate
Org.
Culture

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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Fig. 1 Continued
Theoretical Characterization: NAT / HRT Concept
Complexity

18. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure to inform
operators of all
known risks
associated with well
production casing
cement job*
19. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Use of lost
circulation material
pills as a spacer*
20. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Complacency of the
crew*
21. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Hafle’s failure to
investigate/resolve
negative test
anomalies*
22. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure of well site
leaders to
communicate wellrelated issues with
managers on
Deepwater Horizon*
23. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure to provide
complete and final
negative test
procedures in a
timely fashion*

Coupling

Lack of
Org.
Learning

Lack of
Safety
Priority

Other

Inadequate
Org.
Culture

X

X

X

X

Personal
decision

X

X

X
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24. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Crew’s hesitance to
shut-in the BOP
immediately*
25. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure to conduct the
first of 2 negative
tests*
26. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Crew’s decision to
bypass Sperry-Sun
flow meter while
pumping spacer
overboard*
27. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure of well
control training and
MMS requirements to
address situations
such as negative tests
and displacement
operations*
28. Contributing
Cause: Decision to
use the mud gas
separator during well
control event*
29. Contributing
Cause: Ambiguity in
Transocean well
control manual on
when to use diverter
v. mud gas separator*
30. Contributing
Cause: Failure of
bridge personnel to
notify crew in engine
room about alarms*

Fig. 1 Continued
Theoretical Characterization: NAT / HRT Concept
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Fig. 1 Continued
Theoretical Characterization: NAT / HRT Concept
Complexity

31. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Rig floor crew’s
inability to determine
the location of the
kick in relation to
BOP stack and
volume of
hydrocarbons coming
to rig*
32. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure to initiate
emergency
disconnect system
until after
hydrocarbons were
past BOP stack*
33. Possible
Contributing Cause:
“Inhibited” general
alarm system*
34. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure to train
marine crew to
handle serious
blowout events*
35. Contributing
Cause: Location of
air intakes for engine
room #3 and 6*
36. Contributing
Cause: Failure of
over-speed devices to
initiate shut-down of
engines*

Coupling

Lack of
Org.
Learning

Lack of
Safety
Priority

Other

Inadequate
Org.
Culture

X

X

Divergence
from
optimal
safety
procedures

X

X

X

X

X
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Causal Factor

37. Contributing
Cause: Location
/design of mud gas
separator outlet
vents*
38. Contributing
Cause: Failure to
instruct engine room
crew to initiate
emergency shutdown
sequence after
receiving gas alarms*
39. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Classification of
engine rooms #3 and
#6 as non-classified
areas*
40. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure to identify
risks associated with
locating air intake of
engine room #3 in
close proximity to
drill floor*
41. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Absence of
emergency shutdown devices that
could automatically
be triggered in
response to high gas
levels*
42. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure to document
which devices are
tested *

Fig. 1 Continued
Theoretical Characterization: NAT / HRT Concept
Complexity
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Fig. 1 Continued
Theoretical Characterization: NAT / HRT Concept
Complexity

43. Possible
Contributing Cause:
DP MODU operating
philosophy when
considering the
performance of an
emergency shutdown
(ESD)*
44. Cause of BOP
Stack Failure: Failure
of the BOP to shear
the drill pipe due to
physical location of
pipe outside of the
BSR cutting surface*
45. Contributing
Cause: Elastic
buckling of the drill
pipe *
46. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Forces causing elastic
buckling of the drill
pipe*
47. Contributing
Cause: Failure of
crew to stop work on
the Deepwater
Horizon*
48. Contributing
Cause: Failure to
fully asses the risks
associated with a
number of
operational decisions
leading up to the
blowout*
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X
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Fig. 1 Continued
Theoretical Characterization: NAT / HRT Concept
Complexity

49. Contributing
Causes: Cost or time
saving decisions
made without
considering
contingencies and
mitigation*
50. Contributing
Cause: Failure to
ensure all risks
associated with
operations were as
low as reasonably
practicable*
51. Contributing
Cause: BP’s failure to
have full supervision
and accountability
over activities
associated with the
Deepwater Horizon*
52. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure to document,
evaluate, approve,
and communicate
changes associated w/
DH personnel and
operations*
53. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure of BP and
Transocean to ensure
a common, integrated
approach to well
control*

Coupling

Lack of
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Learning

Lack of
Safety
Priority

X

X

X

X

X
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Culture

X
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X

X
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Fig. 1 Continued
Theoretical Characterization: NAT / HRT Concept
Complexity

54. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure of current
subpart O rule to
identify personnel
who need to be
trained in well
control operations,
specifically in kick
detection*
55. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Conflict between
managers and
confusion about
accountability at the
managerial level†
56. Contributing
Cause: Failure to
consult available
experts on cement
program and negative
test procedures†
57. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Failure of Transocean
to communicate
lessons learned on
similar rig to BP†
58. Possible
Contributing Cause:
Ineffective
management and
communication with
contractors†
59. Contributing
Cause: BP use of
incentives to promote
performance †

Coupling
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X
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60. Contributing
Cause: MMS mission
conflict†
61. Contributing
Cause: MMS lack of
adequate precautions
in permitting
Macondo well site †
62. Contributing
Cause: Lack of
adequate training for
operators to monitor
for well kicks as
required by MMS†
Concept
Indicators
113
Percentage
100
Theory Applicability
Concept Indicators
Percentage
100

Coupling

Lack of
Org.
Learning

X

Lack of
Safety
Priority

Other

Inadequate
Org.
Culture

X

X

X

X

X

X

27
33
23.9
29.2
Normal Accident
60
53.1

6
18
5.3
15.9
High Reliability

22
19.5
46
40.7

7
6.2
Other
7
6.2

Explanation of classifications:
1. Report lists “contamination25, over-displacement26, and/or possibly nitrogen breakout27”
as causes for the shoe track cement to fail. The crew would have been unable to directly
observe these events (as they took place deep within the wellbore), and operators used

25 The materials pumped down a well to cement it are often separated to prevent their mixing and
contamination, in the Macodo well, the crew pumped base oil, a water based spacer, a bottom dart, cement, a
top dart, spacer, and drilling mud (in that order), in order to place the cement in the shoe track (the lowest
portion of the wellbore). The 2011 report asserts that the drilling mud, which was oil based, may have mixed
with and contaminated the cement mixture, thereby compromising the strength of the cement in the well
(U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
26 The 2011 report notes that one possibility in the shoe track failure is that operators may have pushed the
cement/mud/spacer mixture too far through the wellbore, thereby pushing the cement mixture past its
intended location in the shoe track (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
27 Nitrogen breakout refers to nitrogen bubbles in the foamed cement that “’break out’ of suspension – which
can result in inconsistent cement placement and densitites (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE,
2011).”
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nitrified cement specifically to address the issue of lost returns in the well28.
Contamination of the cement may have been an unexpected interaction, indicating
complexity as well.
2. Although the 2011 report indicates that this is not a standard practice, the drilling team at
the Macondo well’s decision to set the production casing in a laminated sand-shale zone
was partially motivated by the need to adapt to the uncertain environment in which the
drilling took place. There was limited information on the hydrocarbon formation at the
outset of the drilling activities at Macondo, and operators drilling the exploratory well
were forced to end the well before its designed depth due to an increasingly slim drilling
margin, which threatened the safety of the well. This change of plans left the shoe cement
in a location where it was more prone to channeling or contamination (U.S. Department
of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). This action was partially motivated by limited indirect
information and adaptation to the unpredictable drilling environment, both signs of
complexity. Additionally, this action was a contributing cause of the cement barrier
failure within the well, and therefore was tightly coupled to this outcome (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
3. The 2011 report notes that the extreme mud losses within the Macondo well during
drilling operations warranted additional caution during the production casing cementing
operations, however it appears that BP failed to consider this fact and consistently made
decisions based on cost and time savings, indicating a lack of prioritization of safety. The
28 “Lost returns” refers to the loss of drilling fluids into fissures in the geologic formation containing
hydrocarbons, which was delicate at the Macondo well site and required special attention to maintaining the
pressure balance required to control hydrocarbon flow while preventing large scale fracturing of the
formation. The designers of the Macondo well used nitrified foam cement in this particular case in order to
reduce the density of the cement in the well, thus lowering the risk of “formation breakdown.” According to
the 2011 report, this type of cement “presented technical challenges in ensuring that the cement mixture is
stable (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).”
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decision not to take extra precautions has been identified as a contributing cause of the
cement barrier failure and therefore was tightly coupled to this outcome (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
4. BP operators did not follow some of the recommended practices in API RP 65 (The
American Petroleum Institute distributes industry standards and recommendations for oil
drilling operations). This decision was identified as a contributing cause of the cement
barrier failure, indicating tight coupling. While some of these actions may have been
motivated by attempts to adapt to the delicate pressure balance within the well, this is
clearly an example of a failure to conduct cementing procedures as instructed by accepted
practices (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
5. BP’s decision to set the float collar (one barrier to well inflow) across the hydrocarbonbearing zones of the formation clearly went against standard practices and increased the
coupling within the well operations by allowing less time for kick response by the crew
by decreasing the “overbalanced” pressure condition between the cement and well
pressures. This was a contributing cause of the cement barrier failure, and signifies tight
coupling (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
6. The 2011 report indicates that BP personnel did not share information with their
operating partners concerning the increased risks inherent in the Macondo well
cementing job, although BP personnel were aware of some of these risks (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). This is clearly a failure of communication
with dire consequences, as this information may have aided in decision making by nonBP personnel. This failure in communication between partners indicates an inadequate
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authority structure. This also signifies tight coupling as this action was a contributing
cause of the cement barrier failure
7. As referred to in the body of this study, BP personnel clearly did not understand some of
the risks associated with the Macondo well (such as those displayed by the OptiCem
model), indicating complexity in accurate risk analysis, however BP personnel also made
decisions to move ahead with cementing operations despite a lack of information on
cement strength and float collar blockage, both of which increased risk but were not
adequately accounted for in BP’s calculations (which ignored the cumulative risk in the
well operations) (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). This lack of direct
information signifies complexity within the system. This failure of interpretation was
identified as a contributing cause of the cement barrier failure, indicating coupling (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). Finally, this hastiness in neglecting risk
analysis was likely driven by cost and production pressures, indicating a lack of
prioritization of safety.
8. The 2011 report notes, “This additional cement would have created another barrier to
prevent flow up the production casing… (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE,
2011),” indicating that the decision not to set cement on top of the wiper plug was not
consistent with best practices in the industry. The fact that well site managers did not
recognize the prudence in placing this barrier indicates organizational hubris within BP,
signifying a lack of organizational learning, while this decision has been identified as a
contributing cause of the cement barrier failure, indicating tight coupling.
9. The float collar was a critical component within the Macondo well, and its operation
affected other processes within the well including the cement placement and well control
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(U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). BP clearly made a faulty decision in
failing to install a debris-tolerant float collar (U.S. Department of the Interior /
BOEMRE, 2011), which had subsequent repercussions within the system by increasing
coupling between components used to control well flow and eventually contributing to
the cement barrier failure.
10. The 2011 report implies that production pressures may have played a part in this
decision, as BP had the option to temporarily abandon the Macondo well without setting
a production casing, which would have cost significantly more yet would have allowed
more time for BP to draft a safer plan to extract hydrocarbons from the delicate well
(U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). The fact that this action increased
risk and was motivated by cost and production pressures indicates a lack of prioritization
of safety.
11. Cementing operations were monitored through calculations and measurements with a
high margin of error, indicating a reliance on indirect information sources – a clear sign
of complexity within the system (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
12. BP and Halliburton made many decisions in conducting the cement casing job in the well
that were motivated by accommodating the unique nature of the well, as well as reducing
operation time and cost savings. (delicate pressure balance and material losses) (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011; National Commission.., 2011c). Many of
these decisions increased complexity within the system as a response to the unstable
environment and signified an inadequate prioritization of safety within the system.
13. There appears to have been a collective failure on the part of operators aboard the
Deepwater Horizon to understand the well system as a whole and to place the
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“anomalies” experienced at the site into the context of cumulative risk and uncertainty
(U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). This represents complexity, in that
operators could not comprehend the entire system and could not observe or comprehend
certain interactions and oddities, however this also may indicate the presence of cost and
production pressures that incentivized finishing the temporary abandonment procedures
in as little time as possible, indicating a lack of prioritization of safety. Finally, the fact
that operators were unable to adequately recognize and respond to anomalies, indicates a
lack of adequate organizational culture within the system (U.S. Department of the Interior
/ BOEMRE, 2011).
14. This failure indicates complexity within the system, as crew would have had to monitor a
variety of information sources to determine that a well kick was in progress (due to the
usage of a multitude of mud pits during displacement operations – a situation that
generally conflicts with industry accepted practices) (U.S. Department of the Interior /
BOEMRE, 2011). This failure also highlights the tight coupling between flow into the
well and a loss of well control, as the crew’s ability to control an influx of hydrocarbons
deteriorates quickly once the hydrocarbons are above the BOP stack (U.S. Department of
the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). Finally, this failure highlights the inability for BP and its
operating partners to adequately staff the Deepwater Horizon with a crew large enough to
effectively conduct displacement and monitoring processes simultaneously and to train
the crew to react to a hydrocarbon influx adequately. This failure signifies complexity,
coupling, and an inadequate organizational culture.
15. This causal factor indicates that negative test procedures are not clearly defined and
generally agreed upon within the industry, indicating limited understanding of some
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processes, which denote complexity within the system (U.S. Department of the Interior /
BOEMRE, 2011). This factor also indicates a lack of adequate training or socialization as
operators and managers were not instructed to dispute the results of the inconclusive
negative test. Finally, the inability of the crew to correctly interpret the negative test
directly contributed to the loss of well control, triggering the blowout and explosion. This
failure signifies complexity, an inadequate organizational culture within the system, and
coupling between misinterpretation of the test results and the blowout and explosion.
16. The crew’s inability to accurately monitor pit levels during the critical negative test
stemmed from the fact that the crew was conducting multiple processes aboard the rig
while displacing drilling mud from the well riser, which obfuscated the signs of a kick.
The crew also chose to bypass the Sperry-Sun flow-out meter, a critical measure of well
flow, which inhibited their ability to detect a kick even further. Finally, it appears that
managers atop the Deepwater Horizon failed to adequately delegate responsibility for
kick monitoring. These decisions were largely motivated by an attempt to reduce
operation time, and therefore signify a failure to prioritize safety, as well as a failure in
organizational culture (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011; National
Commission…, 2011c). This failure is also identified as a contributing cause of the kick
detection failure, signifying coupling (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
17. The failure to investigate the March 8, 2010 well control event (U.S. Department of the
Interior / BOEMRE, 2011) was a failure of management on the part of BP, and the fact
that individuals present during the March 8 kick were also monitoring the Macondo well
on April 20, 2010 (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011) is an example of
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an organization failing to investigate and learn from accidents signifying a lack of
organizational learning.
18. This appears to be a failure of communication between BP and its operating partners,
however, like explanation #6, this may have contributed to the cause of the kick detection
failure (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011) because this information may
have increased operators awareness surrounding well kick monitoring activities. Because
BP did not facilitate open communication with its partners, this is an example of an
inadequate authority structure.
19. The use of lost circulation material pills as a spacer in the well represents complexity, as
this decision created an unexpected interaction that obscured negative test results,
however this decision was also motivated by cost pressures at the risk of safety,
indicating a lack of prioritization of safety (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE,
2011).
20. The crew of the Deepwater Horizon became increasingly “comfortable” with the
operations of the rig, which may have compromised their monitoring and decision
making ability (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). This likely spurred
from a lack of a common safety culture.
21. This identified causal factor specifically focuses on the decision of one individual,
indicating that this is a personnel matter and may have been partially a result of poor
communication (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
22. This appears to be a symptom of a lack of open and free communication, however this
failure may have partially resulted from decentralization in the organization, as well site
leaders were not required to communicate their issues to their superiors in this instance,
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(U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). Finally, the reluctance on the part of
well site leaders to raise issue with the negative test results, and therefore confront more
experienced engineers and managers about these results points to a desire to move
forward with the temporary abandonment procedures quickly. This serves as a tacit
motivation to place cost and production pressures ahead of safety concerns (National
Commission…, 2011c). These factors indicate that this factor can be categorized as a
sign of an inadequate authority structure and lack of prioritization of safety within the
organization.
23. This failure may have resulted from differences of opinions within the industry on
negative test procedures, as well as confusion surrounding operations stemming from
disorganization (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). The difference of
opinion on negative test procedures exemplifies a limited understanding of some
processes, an indicator of complexity, while the fact that BP rushed the preparation of the
negative test plan and procedures even in light of hesitance raised by a manager who had
experienced problems with “just in time delivery of well plans” indicates that the
organization was unable to practice organizational learning or to prioritize safety over
production pressures (National Commission…, 2011c). This factor signifies complexity,
a lack of organizational learning and a lack of prioritization of safety.
24. This causal factor is likely owed to complexity, in that the crew had differing opinions
about the cause of the anomalous occurrences surrounding the hydrocarbon influx. This
failure also signifies tight coupling, however as the crew’s quick response would have
been necessary to intervene before the well blowout was well underway (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). Finally, this failure is partially owed to
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operator error, signifying a lack of adequate training and therefore an inadequate
organizational culture. This failure signifies complexity, coupling, and an inadequate
organizational culture.
25. This appears to have been a divergence from agree-upon industry accepted practices in
deep water drilling. This decision, however, also went against the stated negative test
procedures featured within the MMS approved permitting documents for the Macondo
well site. This decision, based on communications between BP employees, appeared to
have been motivated by at attempt to reduce operating time, signifying a lack of
prioritization of safety. (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
26. This divergence from best practices limited the crew’s ability to accurately monitor the
volume of liquid leaving the well, and thus created unnecessary complexity while
exposing organizational hubris in the failure to use an additional check against flow
within the well (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). The decision to
bypass these critical flow meters may have been motivated by an attempt to save time
during the displacement procedures, indicating a lack of prioritization of safety. This
action also signifies complexity and a lack of organizational learning.
27. This failure indicates complexity in the possible ambiguity within the industry
surrounding negative test and displacement operations. Failure by BP, Transocean, and
MMS to guide operators adequately in safety precautions and risk prone well operations
also signifies a inadequate training and thus a lack of adequate organizational culture
(U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
28. The crew’s decision to use the mud gas separator may have been the result of a lack of
knowledge about the volume of hydrocarbon flow from the well, which would depend on
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inferential information sources (a sign of complexity), as well as a lack of training needed
to adequately assess the condition as a blowout that would overwhelm the mud gas
separator. This decision is also identified as a contributing cause of the response failure,
indicating coupling (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). This factor
signifies complexity, a lack of adequate organizational culture, and coupling.
29. This causal factor may be owed to ambiguity within the industry (differing expert
opinions – signifying complexity) concerning when to use the mud gas separator versus
the diverter in a well control situation, however this is also an example of a lack of
guidance and training provided by Transocean, indicating a lack of adequate
organizational culture. Finally, this factor indicates coupling, as it was identified as a
contributing cause of the response failure (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE,
2011). This factor signifies complexity, a lack of adequate organizational culture, and
coupling.
30. This failure was likely prompted by a lack of emergency training exercises, as indicated
by the testimony of Andrea Fleytas, an officer on the rig, signifying a lack of adequate
organizational culture. This failure was also identified as a contributing cause of the
response failure, indicating coupling (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE,
2011).
31. The rig floor crew’s inability to determine the location of the kick in relation to the BOP
stack and the volume of hydrocarbons coming to the rig signifies tight coupling, as the rig
crew would have had a very short time period in which to make effective actions that
would stop the chain of events that lead to the blowout. Because the crew lacked this
information, they were unable to activate the BOP equipment in a timely fashion and
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were unable to adequately decide whether or not to use the mud gas separator, and thus
made decisions that lead to the ignition of flammable gas atop the rig (U.S. Department
of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
32. This is a clear example of tight coupling, as the emergent situation required quick
response and was hampered by the influx of hydrocarbons above the BOP stack (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
33. The 2011 report correctly identifies this procedure as inconsistent with best practices
(U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
34. This factor indicates a failure on behalf of management to adequately train employees for
emergency situations, which was made worse by a somewhat decentralized command
structure leaving those who were not adequately trained in charge of emergency
operations on the bridge of the Deepwater Horizon (U.S. Department of the Interior /
BOEMRE, 2011). This failure represents a inadequate organizational culture structure
that did not provide a common operating procedure.
35. The location of these air intakes to the outlet of the mud gas separator (which spewed
combustible gas) is an example of complexity, specifically that of proximity of two
components that later harbored an unforeseen interaction. This factor was also identified
as a contributing cause of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, signifying coupling (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
36. The failure of the over-speed devices to shut down the engines on the Deepwater Horizon
exemplifies complexity, as these engines were in proximity to the mud gas separator
outlet and provided power to the rig in an emergency situation while posing an ignition
risk. This failure also signifies tight coupling, however, as indicated by the presence of
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automatic safety barriers which failed, leaving little time for human intervention. This
failure was identified as a contributing cause of the Deepwater Horizon explosion, again
signifying coupling (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
37. The location of the mud gas separator outlet vents, as alluded to previously, created an
unforeseen complex interaction via proximity to combustion engines and sources of
ignition. Further, this factor was identified as a contributing cause of the Deepwater
Horizon explosion, signifying coupling (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE,
2011). This factor signifies complexity and coupling.
38. This failure indicates tight coupling, as the impending emergency situation would have
required quick and decisive action to prevent injury, however this is also an example of
poor communication between operators (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE,
2011).
39. The classification of the engine rooms as non-classified areas increased system
complexity because it created an opportunity for ignition sources to be in close proximity
to combustible gas in a blowout situation, relying only on over-speed devices to prevent
engine failure. This interaction was clearly unseen by designers of the rig, however it
created an environment conducive to an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
40. This, like the previously mentioned factor, indicates complexity unforeseen by the
designers of the Deepwater Horizon DP MODU (U.S. Department of the Interior /
BOEMRE, 2011).
41. The absence of this safety device may have been motivated by the need for emergency
power on the Deepwater Horizon in an emergency situation in order to escape the well
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site; however this added complexity in the design of the rig, as emergency shutdown is
necessary in an emergency that releases combustible gas in the vicinity of ignition
sources. The manual engine shutdown mechanism also indicates tight coupling in the
system as it requires human intervention at the immediate outset of a well control event
releasing combustible gas to prevent the imminent interaction between the engines and
gas (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
42. Neither Transocean nor the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) were able to procure
records tracking the testing of the over-speed devices on the rig engines due to
inconsistent testing procedures (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). This
is clearly a failure to keep orderly documentation of inspection and may indicate a failure
in inspection processes in general.
43. This “operating philosophy” refers to the conflicting needs experienced on a DP MODU
which include the need to shutdown engines on the rig to avoid the risk of igniting
combustible gas versus the need to power the rig in a blowout or emergency situation in
order to disconnect from the well string and evacuate the well site. These conflicting
demands indicate complexity within the system surrounding the engines, which serve a
critical purpose but pose a risk while serving this purpose (U.S. Department of the
Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
44. A primary cause of the Deepwater Horizon blowout was the inability of the BOP to sever
and seal the drill pipe, which was lodged in-between the faces of the blind shear ram
outside of the area of the cutting surface. This is an example of an unexpected interaction
between parts, signifying complexity (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
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45. Unforeseen interactions between the well equipment caused the drill pipe connected to
the Macondo well and the Deepwater Horizon to buckle and become trapped between the
blind shear ram faces, thus disabling the blind shear ram (part of the BOP) from severing
and sealing the well pipe. The 2011 report indicates that two possible scenarios may have
caused this buckling:
a. “Flow from the well forced the section of drill pipe located between the closed
VBR [variable bore rams] and the closed upper annular up into the closed upper
annular to a point where a tool joint stopped against the closed upper annular.
Wellbore conditions produced enough force to cause the pipe to elastically buckle
in this area.”
b. “Flow from the well and weight of the unsupported 5,000 feet of 6 5/8 inch
diameter drill pipe above the closed VBR forced the section of drill pipe located
between the upper VBR and the upper annular into an elastically buckled state
(U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).”
These chains of events were clearly unforeseen and prevented the BOP from working
correctly, indicating complexity and coupling within the system.
46. See above, indicating complexity.
47. The operators on the Deepwater Horizon were authorized to issue a “stop work” order if
they believed that the operations as conducted posed significant danger to the crew. The
fact that these workers were authorized to make this command but did not in the face of
clearly risky operations that were contrary to standard practices (that of utilizing multiple
mud pits in displacement operations) indicates that the attempt to decentralize authority
by allowing operators close to the system some measure of control over its operation did
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not serve the purpose of preventing the 2010 blowout, possibly because cost and
production pressures were ingrained in the organizational culture at the site. This failure
to stop the work at the site is considered a contributing cause of the Macondo Blowout,
signifying coupling (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
48. This appears to be a failure of management motivated by cost and production pressures,
as portrayed in the 2011 BOEMRE report, indicating a lack of prioritization of safety.
This failure, however, was also a contributing cause of the Macondo Blowout, and
therefore is coupled to the chain of events that became this accident (U.S. Department of
the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
49. The 2011 report asserts that BP managers made a number of decisions that may have
increased risk on the Deepwater Horizon without regard to contingencies and mitigation
in the days leading up to the 2010 spill. These decisions appear to be strictly motivated
by cost and production pressures, and are examples of a lack of prioritization of safety.
These decisions also signify coupling within the system as they are identified as
contributing causes of the Macondo Blowout (U.S. Department of the Interior /
BOEMRE, 2011).
50. The management of the Deepwater Horizon clearly did not attempt to reduce risk
inherent in the drilling system to a level as low as reasonably possible, as a prioritization
of safety would require. This failure is also identified as a contributing cause of the
Macondo Blowout, indicating coupling (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE,
2011).
51. Supervision and accountability on the Deepwater Horizon was fragmented and BP did
not effectively manage the operations on the rig, indicating an inadequate organizational
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culture. The 2011 report insists that this created a chaotic environment and was a possible
contributing cause of the blowout. Further, this factor is identified as a contributing cause
of the Macondo blowout, indicating coupling (U.S. Department of the Interior /
BOEMRE, 2011).
52. A number of personnel changes occurred in the management and staffing of the
Deepwater Horizon shortly before the 2010 blowout, including the reorganization of
some departments controlling the planning and temporary abandonment of the well. This
indicates organizational complexity in the system controlling the well, and displays a
temporary weakness in the system as many employees were still settling into their new
roles. Similarly, the operations aboard the Deepwater Horizon were changed and
amended with little notice during the temporary abandonment procedures due to
unforeseen circumstances and changes in the order of procedures as dictated by operators
and engineers. This signifies complexity in the system controlling the Deepwater Horizon
(U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
53. The failure of Transocean and BP to establish common well control guidelines indicates
that blowout situations are dealt with differently between different firms. Because few
well control situations are exactly alike, it appears that this event is complex, and
required pre-considered guidance for operators. The failure of these two companies to
communicate clear guidelines to their employees indicates an inadequate organizational
culture (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
54. The failure of BP’s Subpart O plan to specifically identify some operators with
responsibility for well monitoring, specifically kick detection, indicates an organizational
system with diffuse allocations of responsibility for crucial functions in the drilling
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system. This scenario signifies an inadequate organizational culture. (U.S. Department of
the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
55. Like the previous factor, the presence of unclear or diffuse accountability was a
widespread problem within the BP management following a recent reorganization. This,
as well as personal conflicts between managers, caused confusion at the well site, leading
to a dysfunctional organizational culture (National Commission…, 2011c).
56. BP managers and well site leaders failure to adequately consult available experts
concerning the casing design and negative test procedures is a clear indicator of an
inadequate organizational culture (National Commission…, 2011c). The decision not to
consult these experts had immediate repercussions as seen in the subpar performance of
the cement and the incorrect interpretations of the negative test results by those on the rig.
This failure can be seen as a contributing cause of the cement bond failure.
57. Transocean had recently experienced a well control event during displacement
procedures, a similar experience to that of the later Deepwater Horizon accident.
Although this experience heightened awareness and vigilance within Transocean
concerning this procedure, this information was not shared with BP employees, thereby
preventing organizational learning between the two partners (National Commission…,
2011c).
58. BP failed “to effectively manage the timeline and validity of the cement testing” process
by Halliburton. Halliburton also failed to “effectively communicate cementing issues to
BP.” In this respect, it is clear that communication between the two partners was not open
and responsive to issues, indicating an inadequate organizational culture between the two
entities (National Commission…, 2011c). A possible reason for a lack of oversight over
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the cement testing procedures as conducted by Halliburton may have been production
pressure experienced by BP, as asserted in National Commission…, 2011c. This notion
of cost cutting and rushing production is directly linked to many subsequent decisions by
BP surrounding the Macondo well that may have increased risk. This is indicative of a
lack of prioritization of safety and an inadequate organizational culture.
59. The operating style of BP featured strong incentives for reducing cost and promoting
production efficiency, which may have been promoted at the expense of safety, urging
some managers to “treat redundancies as inefficiencies.” This is a clear example of a lack
of prioritization of safety within the system and is coupled to many other decisions and
actions leading to the 2010 spill (National Commission…, 2011c).
60. The conflict between the two tasks of MMS (promoting and regulating offshore
exploration) was a direct contributor to the way in which BP approached well safety,
design, and processes at the Macondo well. This lack of clear prioritization of safety on
behalf of MMS is coupled to a lack of safety prioritization within BP (National
Commission…, 2011c).
61. The permitting procedure for BP to commence drilling and temporarily abandoning the
Macondo well was not adequately rigorous, and therefore demonstrated a lack of
adequate oversight by MMS. The Chief Counsel’s Report on the 2010 spill drafted by the
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Spill and Offshore Drilling lists
numerous examples of permit requirements or policies that were overlooked or waived by
MMS in reference to the Macondo well site. Some decisions, like allowing BP to set the
cement surface plug deeper than standard requirements dictated, were made quickly with
little evident consideration of overall risk, and may have directly contributed to the spills
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occurrence (National Commission…, 2011c). The Chief Counsel’s Report makes a
thorough case for the fact that MMS not only failed to apply adequate safety
requirements to BP in this case, but generally neglected to keep regulatory pace with
technological advances in deep water drilling (National Commission…, 2011c). The fact
that this agency failed to address serious safety concerns and adjust its procedures in
response to new technology indicates that it failed to practice organizational learning or
safety prioritization. The fact that these failures were likely linked to the lax safety
precautions in the design of the Macondo well and temporary abandonment procedures
also points to coupling within the system (National Commission…, 2011c).
62. Regulations covering drilling activities on the Deepwater Horizon required that operators
responsible for well kick monitoring complete a form of “MMS-approved well control
training.” This training, however proved inadequate due to its focus on well kick
response during drilling operations not during temporary abandonment (National
Commission…, 2011c). This lack of adequate training as mandated by MMS was a
failure on the part of the regulatory regime to instill a common set of operating
procedures in the workforce directly responsible for monitoring for well kicks, indicating
an inadequate organizational culture within the system. Further, this failure was likely a
contributing cause of the well operators at Macondo to recognize a well kick until it was
thoroughly underway, leading to the blowout. This is an example of coupling.
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Fig. 2 Calibration of Normal Accident Criteria based on Perrow’s (1999) Analyses (Perrow,
1999: 98-99, 232-241

University Dispute Over Tenure – Example of Complexity
Signifies
Causal Factor
Other
Complexity
Decision to deny tenure to
X
teacher
Quality of service program
X
Dismissal linked to service
X
program
Student protest
X
Creation of evaluation
X
program
Application of program to
X
other teachers
Unexpected demands
X
Total Factors
7
4
3
Percentage
100
57.1
42.9
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Grand Teton Dam Failure – Example of Tight Coupling
Signifies
Causal Factor
Other
Coupling
Failure in one part of dam
linked to structural integrity of
X
the whole
Critical dam failure linked to
X
destruction
Connection between dam
X
failure and earthquakes
Failure in inter-agency
X
communication
Lack of action taken
X
concerning known risks
Agency relationships inspired
X
complacency
Investment in dam
X
Risk data ignored
X
Cracks in dam structure
X
downplayed
Institutional hubris
X
Dam filled too quickly
X
Unpredictable environment
X
Failure to recognize
X
anomalies/signs of danger
Failure to adequately inspect
X
dam construction
Professional differences
concerning connection
X
between earthquakes and
reservoirs
Scale of the dam
X
Proximity of dam to human
X
settlements
Levels of potential energy
X
produced by dam containment
Faulty data analysis
X
Total Factors
19
9
10
Percentage
100
47.4
52.6

Note: Neither of these events are considered a normal accident by Perrow.
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Fig. 3 Approximate Location of BP Deepwater Horizon on Perrow’s Interaction / Coupling Chart
(Perrow, 1999:97)

DH System

Explanation of Placement:
I have chosen to locate deep water drilling in the Gulf of Mexico in the Interaction /
Coupling Chart in the upper right quadrant of the chart (indicating that this process features
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moderate complexity and tight coupling) based on the results of my analysis of the concept
indicators identified in causal factors of the oil spill (p. 88). Based on Perrow’s analysis of a dam
failure and university’s dispute with students concerning tenure, I have concluded that if 50 % of
an accidents causal factors can be linked to a concept indicator within normal accident theory
(complexity or coupling), this system can be described as exemplifying a high level of the
indicated quality. This 50 % relationship is employed as the upper bound of concept expression
within the analyzed systems. Because the Deepwater Horizon system exemplified a moderate
degree of complexity shown by 23.9 % of its concept indicators and a significant degree of
coupling shown by 29.2 % of its concept indicators, this system occupies its above designated
area.

This location is near “Aircraft” (the operation of aircraft, not to be confused with airways
control) and “Chemical plants.” This region corresponds to the Deepwater Horizon system
because deep water drilling is similarly tightly coupled and complex as that of the aircraft
industry because it takes place in an unforgiving environment.29 The Deepwater Horizon system
is also located in a position near that of a chemical plant because both of these processes include
specific control parameters of high temperature, high pressure, and massive releases of energy. It
should be noted that although the Deepwater Horizon system is similar to marine transport in
that it took place on a marine craft (a DP MODU), the processes of extracting hydrocarbons from

29

Deep water drilling occurs at sea, where accidents may not always cause the rig to sink and may lend more
opportunities for human intervention in a time of crisis, as opposed to in high altitudes, in which mishaps can
result in the crashing of the aircraft. Perrow discusses the airline industry in pages 121-146 of his 1999
publication.
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a deep water well significantly increase the complexity and slightly increase the coupling above
those levels experienced in marine transport30.

30

The demands on a mobile marine drilling rig are not simply those of staying afloat in a harsh environment,
but also consist of controlling massive underground pressure and storing and transferring large quantities of
liquid from the rig to the well and vice versa (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). Perrow
discusses the marine transportation industry in pages 171-223 of his 1999 publication.
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Fig. 4: BP Decisions and Associated Cost, Time and Risks (recreated from U.S. Department of
the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011)
BP Decisions and Associated Cost, Time and Risks
BP Decision
6 versus 21 centralizers
Cement bond log
Full Bottoms Up on 4/19
Long String versus Liner
Timing of Lock Down
Sleeve Installation After
the Negative Test
Pumping mud to boat
while displacing
Lost Circulation Material
(“LCM”) pills combined
for Spacer

Less Cost to BP
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Less Rig Time
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Greater Risk
Yes
Yes
Yes
--

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Unknown

Contextual description of each listed BP Decision
1. 6 versus 21 centralizers
The 2011 report defines centralizers as “pieces of equipment used to keep the casing
centered in the well (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).” These allow
cement to be installed evenly surrounding the well casing in the well bore, and therefore
are crucial to the structural integrity of the cement job in a well. During the cement
modeling stage, Halliburton employees modeled a number of well construction
techniques and situations in order to find the optimal method of cementing and
temporarily abandoning the Macondo well. These models showed that with 10
centralizers, cement channeling was possible and was accompanied by a “moderate” gas
flow potential, while with 21 centralizers, channeling would not occur and gas flow
potential was minor (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). BP managers
were clearly aware of the results of this modeling, as demonstrated by their request for 15
additional centralizers, however operators decided not to install these centralizers at the
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well cementing phase because they incorrectly perceived them to be the incorrect types of
centralizers for the job (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011; Deepwater
Horizon Study Group, 2011).
2. Cement bond log
A cement evaluation log is a common element of a well cementing procedure such as that
conducted by the Deepwater Horizon crew, in order to anticipate fluid losses during the
casing cement job and to verify the strength of the cement placement. During the
temporary abandonment procedures of the Macondo well, however, BP employees
checked the integrity of the cement by checking “lift pressure” and evaluating if there had
been apparent fluid losses. Based on these tests, Mark Hafle, a leader in the operation,
then decided that a cement log was unnecessary and sent the logging crew home (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
3. Full Bottoms Up on 4/19
A “full bottoms up” refers to a process in which the operators on a rig in charge of
cementing the well circulate drilling mud through the well casing in order to 1) clean out
the well and 2) analyze any material circulated from the bottom of the well in order to
determine if hydrocarbons are present (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE,
2011). In the cementing process of the Macondo well, however, operators decided not to
conduct a full bottoms up circulation due to concerns about lost returns (fluids lost into
the formation), which they had previously experienced with the well (U.S. Department of
the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
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4. Long String versus Liner
In considering the design of the Macondo well, BP was faced with two options to cement
the well for temporary abandonment, the liner with tieback and a long string design.
Although there are many strengths and weaknesses associated with both designs, BP
ultimately chose the long string design, however this decision increased risk, according to
many reports, and was influenced at least partially by cost savings and reduced
installation time (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011; Deepwater Horizon
Study Group, 2011). It should also be noted that BP leaders had a third option to consider
in the temporary abandonment procedures, that of abandoning the well with no
production casing installed in order to reassess the plan of action in designing the well, a
procedure which is often utilized in wells with little drilling margin(U.S. Department of
the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). This third option, although likely safer, would have cost
considerably more (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
5. Timing of Lock Down Sleeve Installation After the Negative Test
The 2011 report notes that a lock-down sleeve holds the production casing (the tube
through which the rig extracts hydrocarbons) to the wellhead during production (against
the pressures generated by well flow) (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE,
2011). The report indicates that although it was not originally planned to install the lockdown sleeve, the crew of the Deepwater Horizon were instructed to install this equipment
upon BP leaders discovering that this installation would save time and money if
conducted by the Deepwater Horizon (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE,
2011). Simply put, the decision to set the lock-down sleeve during temporary
abandonment was unnecessary and increased risk by demanding operators to conduct a
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procedure that they had little experience with and necessitating a deeper setting of the
surface plug within the well, which contributed to the severe pressure differential in the
well during displacement procedures, directly increasing risk of a blowout (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
6. Pumping mud to boat while displacing
Careful monitoring of displacement volumes in temporary abandonment procedures is
critical in order to observe and respond to well kicks (U.S. Department of the Interior /
BOEMRE, 2011). Best practices in the deep water drilling industry advise operators to
displace drilling mud to a single active pit (storage vessel on the marine unit) in order to
facilitate this monitoring (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). In the case
of the temporary abandonment of the Macondo well, however, operators displaced
drilling mud to multiple pits on the boat, which was not optimal and prevented
mudloggers from accurately monitoring the volume of fluid coming out of the well (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).
7. Lost Circulation Material (“LCM”) pills combined for Spacer
Spacer fluid is used in the context of displacement procedures to separate drilling mud
from seawater (in displacement, drilling mud is removed and replaced by seawater) (U.S.
Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011). In the case of the Deepwater Horizon,
operators utilized a large amount of lost circulation material (material used to prevent lost
returns of drilling mud into the formation) as a spacer (U.S. Department of the Interior /
BOEMRE, 2011). This decision is portrayed in the 2011 report as a sort of improvisation
by BP in order to avoid disposal costs for the lost circulation material, indicating that the
risk and possible interaction between this improvised spacer material and the well
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equipment and interfaces with seawater and drilling mud (U.S. Department of the Interior
/ BOEMRE, 2011).
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Fig. 5:: Relative location of the hydrocarbon bearing sandstone formations (Pay Sands).
(Deepwater Horizon Study Group, 2011)

Image Source: Adapted
dapted from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
and Offshore Drilling, Op. ct. 24.
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Fig. 6: The Blowout Preventer used on the Deepwater Horizon (Deepwater Horizon Study
Group, 2011)

Image Source: Aconawellpro, ref:
http://www.aconawellpro.com/@api/deki/files/251/=MiniSeminar_Macondo_August_2010.pdf.
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Fig. 7: Off Center Drill Pipe (U.S. Department of the Interior / BOEMRE, 2011).

Source: DNV
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